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Economic Substantive Due Process
and the Right of Livelihood
BY WAYNE MCCORMACK*
INTRODUCTION
Economic substantive due process has been resurrected or, perhaps
more accurately, born again in a slightly altered state.' Many com-
mentators have expressed interest in reviving the doctrine ever since it
became moribund in the constitutional revolution of 1937.2 Recently, the
* Professor of Law, University of Utah. BA 1966, Stanford University; J.D. 1969,
University of Texas. My thanks to the staff of the University of.Utah Law Library for
their unstinting support of research efforts.
' Voodoo religions contain a useful juristic concept known as the "undead" or' zom-
bies." These beings are persons who have died but have not done so fully. The zombie's
death is quickly followed by reanimation and an existence between life and death. See
WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICrIONARY 1354 (8th ed. 1981). Unlike these undead,
economic substantive due process appears capable of true resurrection. Perhaps the
posture of substantive due process from 1937 to the present has been something like the
chrysalis state in which some species exist between larva and adult. Substantive due
process is now waking up.
' In response to the question "What was wrong with Lochner?," a number of law
review articles in the past couple of decades have given surprising answers, many of
which are some variation on the theme "Not a hell of a lot." See Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379, 447 (1988)
(attributing the decline of the doctrine to shifting theories of political economy); Michael
. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited" Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases,
71 NW. U. L. REV. 417, 467-69 (1976) (commenting on modem substantive due process
cases); Stephen A. Siegel, UnderstandIng the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy
Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187, 261-62 (1984) (tracing
the impact and decline of the property/privilege distinction and nondiscretionary judicial
law-making); Cass 1L Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLU L. REv. 873, 916-17 (1987)
(identifying Loclner-like premises in current constitutional law); Mark Tusnet, The
Newer Property: Suggeston for the Revival of Substantive Due Process, 1975 SuP. CT.
REV. 261, 273-77 (criticizing the two-step analysis of due process claims). At least one
author has praised the doctrine but decided that the costs of its implementation still
outweigh its benefits. Michael I Phillips, Another Look at Economic Substantive Due
Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 265, 324.
Ever since the New Deal revolution, occasional commentators have considered the
desirability of having some judicial review of the area of economic legislation. See
AURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSMII=r ONAL LAW 578-86 (2d ed. 1988) (describing
KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL
doctrine has been reborn in a number of guises other than the Due Process
Clause and may now lead to recognition of some limited economic rights,
particularly the right of livelihood and perhaps the broader right of competi-
tion.
Many authors have made strong arguments for an intensified review of
legislation affecting economic and property interests In recent years, a
growing number of authors from the left side of the political spectrum have
recognized that some economic functions, at least those without which it is
diflicult for an individual to be whole in modem society, ought to receive
protection from government interference It has not yet been demonstrated,
however, that the vehicle to provide such protection, substantive due process,
has already been resurrected by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The principal objective of this Article is not to review the arguments in
terms of what interests ought to be protected. The Article is not meant to
praise substantive due process so much as to disinter it. More precisely, the
Article sketches the history of the courts' resurrection of economic substantive
due process and the limits on its operation that will likely prevail in the
predictable future.
the decline of Lochner); Richard V. Carpenter, Our Constitutional Heritage: Economic
Due Process and the State Courts, 45 A.B.AJ. 1027, 1029 (1959) (praising state due
process decisions in accord with the principles of democracy); John A. C. Hetherington,
State Economic Regulation and Substantive Due Process of Law (pts. 1 & 2), 53 NW. U.
L. REV. 13, 226 (1958) (discussing the development of a body of state substantive law);
Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 35, 62 ('All things considered, then, it seems best that
the cause of economic rights be left by the Supreme Court to lie in its imeasy grave:);
Monrad G. Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN.
L. REV. 91, 118 (1950) (reviewing state substantive due process decisions since 1937);
Note, State Economic Substantive Due Process: A Proposed Approach, 88 YALE L.L
1487, 1488 (1979) (criticizing and suggesting an alternative to modes of review in state
courts). As their titles indicate, several of these articles conclude that state courts could
appropriately apply substantive due process in lieu of federal judicial intervention.
3 See RICHARD A. EPSTEN, TAKINGS: PwRIATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN 126-45 (1985); ELLEN F. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT
DOMAIN 261-66 (1987); BERNARD H. SImAAN, ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND TE
CONSITUTION 318-31 (1980); Note, Resurrecting Economic Rights: The Doctrine of
Economic Substantive Due Process Reconsidered 103 HARV. L. REV. 1363, 1367-77
(1990) (arguing that the courts should protect economic rights); Richard A. Epstein,
Needed" Activist Judges for Economic Rights, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1985, at 32; Gordon
Growitz, Constitution Protects Life, Liberty and Property, WALL ST. ., Oct. 8, 1986, at
34.
4 See Charles A. lkeich, The Individual Sector, 100 YALE L.J. 1409, 1409-17 (1991)
(discussing the need to define a constitutionally protected sector of individual power);
Tushnet, supra note 2, at 273-84.
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This Article highlights three historical points. First, substantive due
process comprised part of the received body of English law in 1791;' as
such, it included at least some protection against a government's creation
of unregulated monopolies.6 Second, prior to the New Deal, substantive
due process was an accepted part of a unified doctrine of due process; the
separate concepts of substantive and procedural due process came into
existence only later to describe what the Court believed that it was no
longer doing.7 Third, the Court has in fact reinvented the doctrine under
various, different names and based these new doctrines on different
sections and clauses of the Constitution.8 The final section of this Article
deals with how the Court might shape this new version of the doctrine
into a useful and well-contained judicial tooL9 The Article concludes that
the Supreme Court's recognition of substantive due process as the source
of a protected right of livelihood would have value, provided that the
Court limits the operation of the right to narrowly circumscribed uses.
The time has not come to recognize a general right of competition, as
some have urged,"0 and no reason exists to infer a general freedom from
regulation out of the Due Process Clause.
I. THE PRE- AND POST- NEW DEAL CHALLENGES
Long before Lochner," indeed long before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment British and American courts protected many
5 This point has been developed at length in Robert E. Riggs, Substantive Due
Process in 1791, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 941, 941-63.
sROSOE PouND, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEEs OF LIBERTY
48 (1957) (collected lectures delivered in 1945). See infra notes 19-41 and accompanying
text
7 See infra note 43 and accompanying text
" Professor Wonnell developed some of the fist and third points ten years ago.
Christopher E. Wonnell, Economic Due Process and the Preservation of Competition, 11
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 91 (1983). There are several reasons for publishing anew analysis
now. One reason is that much has happened in the intervening ten years. Another is that
most of Wonnell's analysis was couched in economic and political theory rather than in
historical terms. The historical flavor provides some reasons for both recognition and
limitation of the claimed rights. Finally, my analysis of the judicial process leads to some
different conclusions than his. See infra notes 181.-95 and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 342-55 and accompanying text
'0 See Wonnell, supra note 8, at 134.
" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a New York law
establishing a maximum work week for bakers); cf. Day-Brite IUghling, Inc. v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1951) (upholding a law forbidding employers to dock wages for employee
absence on election day).
1993-94]
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facets of the individual's right to pursue a gainful occupation against
encroachment by the government." The Lochner Court went further and
purported to scrutinize virtually all social legislation and economic
regulation for the "reasonableness" of the legislative decision.'3 The rise
of the regulatory-welfare state was probably impossible under the Lochner
Court's regime because of the rigid Lochnerian separation of the private
and public spheres of action.' Certainly, the lack of substantive judicial
review of government regulation and subsidization during the post-New
Deal era has made imposition of social programs and economic regulation
much easier."5 But despite the occasional judicial protestations of
abstinence from the review of our government's economic programs, a
total judicial abstinence would not have been appropriate and has, in fact,
never been the rule.
Government intervention into the markets operates in a variety of
ways. Ours is a government designed to implement public choices in a
controlled fashion. We have an understandable tendency not to trust
government blindly with social and economic decisions because
government can be subverted by social and economic pressure groups."6
In our federal system, this potential for capture may become particularly
acute as a result of the ability of economic pressure groups to concentrate
energy and resources on a relatively short legislative session, giving them
undue influence on a given state legislature. Substantive due process
is an important, but disregarded, method for preventing distortion of the
process of socio-economic choice making. In the pre-- and post- New
Deal periods, there have been two particular categories of protected
activity: restrictions on entry into markets and restrictions on public
employment. These two categories present the most convincing cases for
substantive review because they reflect the historic concern over
governmental restrictions on what this Article will call the right of
livelihood," a right that has historic corollaries in the freedom from
unregulated monopolies.
SSee Wonnell, supra note 8, at 128.
" See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 ('In every case that comes before this court, ... the
question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate exercise of the police
power of the State.. . T").
14 Se Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57; TRIBE, supra note 2, at 580.
1" See Phillips, supra note 2, at 274; see also Growitz, supra note 3, at 34 ('7he
New Deal required judges to turn their backs on 150 years of interpretation and ignore
the text's protection of economic rights.").
16 Wonnell, supra note 8, at 100-11.
'7 See Paulsen, supra note 2, at 117.
" See generally infra notes 309-25 and accompanying text (discussing the right to
liveihood).
400 [Vol. 82
RIGHT OF LIvELIHOOD
A. The Textual and Historical Basis of Economic Substantive Due
Process
As an initial matter, we need to deal with the propriety of implying
unenumerated rights from the Due Process Clause." The phrase "sub-
stantive due process" itself has an oxymoronic sound to it-how can
process have a substantive branch as well as a procedural branch? In
1934, Professor Corwin urged that the commonsense reading of the
phrase was probably correct:
To the lay mind the term "due process of law' suggests at once a form of
trial, with the result that if it limits the legislature at all, it is only when that
body is delineating the process whereby the legislative will is to be applied
to specific cases; and a little research soon demonstrates that the lay mind
is probably right so far as the history of the matter is concerned.2
Yet a reading of the history different than that of Corwin is possible.
According to this differing view, the phrase "due process" derives from
the "law of the land" clause of Magna Carta,2W ' which was later modified
into the "due process" clause.2 This "law of the land' concept included
a variety of nascent, unenumerated rights. Lord Coke believed that among
these rights was the right of Englishmen to be protected against unjusti-
fied restrictions on market entry. Coke went as far as to say, "Generally
all monopolies are against this great charter, because they are against the
liberty and freedome of the subject, and against the law of the land."
" For a more complete treatment of this history, see Riggs, supra note 5, at 947-48,
987-99.
20 EDWARD S. CORWiN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SupRE COURT: A HISTORY OF
OUR CONSTIUTIONAL THEORY 68-69 (1934).
' "No free man shall be taken or imprisoned or disseised or outlawed or exiled or
in any way ruined, nor will we go or send against him, except by the lawful judgement
of his peers or by the law of the land." Magna Carta para. 39, reprinted in JAMES C.
HOLT, MAGNA CARTA app. IV (1965). See also ch. 3 of 28 Edw. 111 (1354) (quoted in
Riggs, supra note 5, at 954): 'No man of what state or condition he be, shall be put out
of his lands or tenements, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, without being
brought to answer by due process of law." This assurance was reaffinned in the Petition
of Right, 1627 reprinted in POUND, supra note 6, at 167.
2 See Riggs, supra note 5, at 988.
Coke's discussion of the concept is worth more detail:
This word, libertates, liberties, hath three significations:
1. First, as it hath been said, it signifieth the laws of the realme, in which
respect this charter is called diarta libertatum
1993-94]
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Refening to decisions of Lord Coke" and Lord Holt, as well as other
British decisions, and asserting the heavy reliance of the American revolution-
aries on these sources, Roscoe Pound made a strong argument in 1945 that
the American protection for liberties under due process included unenumer-
ated rights against monopoly, as part of the "law of reason : 6 Although the
British courts eventually developed the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy,
under which even the Magna Carta may be amended by the omnipotent
parliament, Lord Coke and Lord Holt both viewed even Acts of Parliament
as being subject to the established rights of Englishmen 7 The extent to
which the doctrine of Parliamentary Supremacy had won over the law of
reason by 1776, 1789, or 1791 is unclear. Pound claimed that the law of
reason still prevailed during that time period.' Blackstone's Commentaries
of 1765 seem to point in the direction of parliamentary supremacy, but he still
listed three "absolute rights" assured by the common law: personal security,
personal liberty, and property.
Fears of some forms of protection for property and vested rights that
were viewed as perpetuating the aristocracy constituted a major concern of
some of the populist-oriented Antifederalists and resulted in an early distrust
of vested rights2 ° In rebuttal to the Antifederalist's attacks, James Madison
argued that the right of property included "the free use of [one's] faculties and
free choice of the objects on which to employ them."'" Whatever the
2. It signifieth the freedomes, that the subjects of England have; ...
3. Liberties signifleth the franchises, and priviledges, which the subjects have of
the gift of the king,...
So likewise, and for the same reason, if a graunt be made to any man, to have
the sole making of cards, or the sole dealing with any other trade, flat graunt is
against the liberty and freedome of the subject that before did, or lawfully might
have used that trade, and consequently against Vis great charter.
Generally, all monopolies are against this great charter, because they are against
the liberty and fredome of the subject, and against the law of the land.
EDWARD CoKE, 2 INsTuTEs OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND (1642), reprinted in POUND,
supra note 6, at 150.
' See, e.g., Bagg's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1271 (1616) (refusing to allow a citizen to
be disenfranchised for breach of peace).
' See POUND, supra note 6, at 53 (discussing the opinions of early English judges
concerning Parliamentary Supremacy).
26 Id.
27 Id. at 53-54.
28 Id. at 54.
2 2 WIIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129 (St. George Tucker ed., 1965).
'0 See Siegel, supra note 2, at 190-91.
31 James Madison, Property, The National Gazette, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 6
WRrriNGs 101 (G. Hunt ed., 1900-10).
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original scope of the constitutional protection of economic rights from
legislative attack the later development of this protection is said by
Corwin to have
represented the essential spirit and point of view of the founders of
American Constitutional Law, who saw before them the same problem
that had confionted the Convention of 1787, namely, the problem of
harmonizing majority rule with minority rights, or more specifically, the
republican institutions with the security of property, contracts, and
commerce.
3 2
Thus, due process review had become intertwined with the "natural
rights" concepts of the pre-revolutionary war period.3 While the
Supreme Court initially flirted with the concept under such doctrinal
headings as the "social compact!' origins of the Constitution,' state
courts developed protections for "vested rights."'  With the adoption of
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, many observers believed
that the Court would import reasonableness review into its newly
obtained powers of review over state legislation.' This expectation was
thwarted by The Slaughterhouse Cases.37 The dissents from Slaughter-
house, however, would later become the majority in Lochner.'
- Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine ofAmerican Constitaional Law, 12 MICH.
L. REV. 247, 276 (1914) (praising the doctrine of vested rights).
' See, e.g., RODNEY L. MOTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW §§ 81-82 (1926).
-u See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalL.) 386, 387 (1798) (Chase, J.) (sftiig down a
statute setting aside a decree of a court that had disproved a will); Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 138 (1810) (Marshall, CJ.) (holding that a state may not pass a
statute declaring its own obligations void).31 The most significant state case was Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. (3 Kernan) 378
(1856) (striking down a statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating beverages). Throughout
the early part of the nineteenth centmuy, protection for "vested rights" became well-
established in the state courts, although the police power of the state was acknowledged
as having some role in limiting vested rights. See Corwin, sura note 32, at 257, 275;
Lowell J. Howe, The Meaning of 'Due Process of Law" Prior to the Adoption of the
Foateenth Amendment, 18 CAL. L. REV. 583, 601, 604 (1930) (explaining how the
interplay of the police power with the vested rights doctrine created an extra-constitutional
basis for judicial review).
' See 6 CHARLEs FAmMAN, HISTORY OF TEE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, PART 1 (1971).
17 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (upholding the right of state legislatures to grant
exclusive rights, in this case a franchise to slaughter-houses in New Orleans, when doing
so serves the public interest).
3' See ARTHUR S. MULLER, TEE SUPREME COURT AND AMERIcAN CAPrTAIusM 61-62
(1968) (discussing Lochner and the development of law in this area); Walton H.
1993-94]
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In light of this history, particularly that of our British heritage and the
pre-Fourteenth Amendment cases,39 it is plausible that both the Fifth
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment concepts of due process
included some unenumerated rights, such as vested rights and the English
proscriptions on unregulated monopolies. This amalgam justifies the
implication of what will be described below as the right of livelihood.
Why would a constitutional principle, which has to do with the formation
of governments, be concerned about the right of livelihood, which is
more a matter of good policy than a matter of the political relation of the
individual to government? One argument is that of group theory, which
poses that unregulated monopolies often result from group pressures that
create a perversion of the political process and can easily extend to a
perversion of the process on other fronts.4° In the attempt to create a
limited government, it was only realistic to anticipate some of the
government's abuses and try to guard against them-4 1
B. Post-New Deal Unlinking and Linking of Procedural and
Substantive Due Process
No recognized distinction between procedural and substantive due
process existed until after the New Deal eliminated the substantive
protections.42 During the Lochner natural law era, the courts employed
Fourteenth Amendment due process and natural law concepts, using due
process as a unitary concept, without the substantive descriptor, for the
Court's weighing of the reasonableness and fairness of the government's
actions.43 The only use of what we now know as procedural due process
was in the judicial supervision of other courts, an area in which due
process was not a strong concern because judicial rules usually embodied
the concepts of reasonableness and fairness without need for resort to
external concepts such as due process.
Hamilton, The Path of Due Process of Law, 48 ETRIcs 269, 294-95 (1938).
" Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.) 386 (1798); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch)
87 (1810); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. (3 Keman) 378 (1856).
40 Wonnell, supra note 8, at 103-08.
4 Richard A. Posner, The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 4, 22-24 (1987) (concluding that the group pressure rationale does not justify
"constitutionaliz[ing] laissez faire).
See Howard L Graham, Procedure to Substance-Exta-JudicIal Rise of Due
Process, 1830-1860, 40 CAL. L. Ray. 483, 488-94 (1952); Note, supra note 3, at 1370.
43 See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 664-66; MoTr, supra note 33, at 437.
' Following the Civil War amendments, during the Lochner era there was some
mention of due process when federal courts began to exercise supervisory authority over
[Vol 82
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The separation of procedural and substantive due process followed a
rather hesitant path. During the 1930s, the unitary concept of due process
began to divide into three different meanings in addition to the concept's
reasonableness aspect. First; through the Fourteenth Amendment, due
process became the vehicle for use of the criminal procedure safeguards
of the Bill of Rights against the states.45 Second, due process became
the vehicle for incorporation of the "substantive" values from the Bill of
Rights, particularly the First Amendment, against the states' Third,
when the New Deal's administrative agencies appeared, due process
formed the basis for judicial controls on administrative action.47
courts not within their direct control, the state courts. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714,
733 (1877) (due process as one alternative for requiring personal service prior to state
court judgment), overruled by Schaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Earle v.
McVeigh, 91 U.S. 503, 507 (1876) (using due process language to find that the statute
of a state that allowed notice by posting was inadequate). But see Ray v. Norseworthy,
90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 128 (1875) (no mention of due process when requiring notice and
hearing in federal bankruptcy court).
"' See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 286-87 (1936) (coerced confession
inadmissible); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 110 (1934) jury view of premises
in defendant's absence not a denial of due process), overrded by Malloy v. Hogan, 378
U.S. 1 (1964); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65-71 (1932) (assistance of counsel
required in capital cases).
4 See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934) (order
requiring male students to take a course in military training did not violate due process);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931) (the Due Process Clause safeguards the
liberty of the press), overruled on other grounds by Griin v. United States, 112 S. CL
446 (1991); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (definition of liberty under
Due Process Clause includes freedom of speech). The incorporation of the First
Amendment had begun earlier in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (due
process protects freedom of speech and of the press).
' See United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1938) (directing disposition
of finds impounded by a district court); Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 356
(1936) (administrative hearing scheme met requirements of due process); West Ohio Gas
Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Ohio, 294 U.S. 63, 70 (1934) (holding that utility's cost
distribution scheme violated due process); see also Note, Constitutional Law-Judicial
Review ofAdministrative Determinations, 24 GEO. L.J. 1008, 1008-10 (1935) (discussing
the extent of judicial review). The shift away from review of utility rates for their
"substantive" validity (i.e., whether they permitted a fair return on investment) to review
only for procedural regularity, though not accompanied by an express declaration, was a
clear delineation of procedural and substantive review. See American Toll Bridge Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 307 U.S. 486, 492-96 (1939) (holding that toll rates did not
deprive plaintiff ofproperty without due process); Railroad Cominm'nof Cal. v. Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1938) (holding that setting gas rates did not result in
confiscation); Chicago, M. & St. P.R. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456 (1890)
(allowing commission to fix rates conclusively violated due prcess).
1993-941
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The Court's decision in Nebbia v. New York' that there would be
no protectable liberty interests in economic matters created the need for
a label to distinguish those areas of judicial review that were permissible
from those that were no longer permissible. At first, a few minority
opinions and arguments of counsel began to use language that distin-
guished the permissible functions of due process from the "substantive"
'values of "liberty" that had been protected under the Lochner doctrine' 9
Thus, the notion was born that a difference existed between procedural
and substantive due process.
The first use in the Supreme Court' ° of the phrase "procedural due
process" occurred in a dissent to a criminal procedure case in 19341
Procedural due process showed up once in 1937,' three times in
1938s3 and twice in 1939,' by which time it was reasonably well-
accepted.
The first use of the phrase "substantive due process" occurred in a
dissent to a land regulation case in 1948.' s Substantive due process
showed up in two more dissents' before it finally appeared in a 1954
majority opinion involving the power of Congress to enact certain
deportation rules.' A Supreme Court majority did not use the phrase
4 291 U.S. 502, 538-39 (1933) (upholding a statute fixing the price at which store
keepers could buy and sell milk).
4' See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
s' The wonders of computerized legal databases allow us to make confident
statements about precise phrasing in court opinions. The statements that follow are based
on repeated searches of both Lexis and Westlaw, searching for specific phrases and for
use of words within certain proximities to each other.
Si Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 100 (1934).
'2 Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 337, 356 (1937).
5 Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 224 (1938) (denial of ability to
present case violates due process); Railroad Comm'n of Cal. v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 302
U.S. 388, 392-93 (1938) (hearing procedure to set gas rates did not deny due process);
United Pub. Gas Serv. Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 128 (1938) (order-fixing rates did not
violate due process).
m United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 190-91 (1939); American Toll Bridge v.
Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 307 U.S. 486, 492-96 (1939).
" Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 90 (1948) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (arguing in favor of a limitation on pumping from an underground reservoir
although the majority felt it placed an impennissible burden on the owner).
5' Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,222-24 (1953) (Jackson,
J., dissenting) (concluding that detention of an alien does not violate substantive due
process provided that procedural due process is met); Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 277 (1952) (Reed, J., dissenting) (referring to incorporation of the First Amendment
into the Fourteenth Amendment through the Due Process Clause).
" Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) (afm~ning congressional power to
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"substantive due process" to describe Lochner-style judicial review until
1965.' In the meantime, the Court stated on several occasions that it no
longer used "due process" to inquire into the reasonableness of legislative
judgments and rules. 9
C. Anticompetitive Regulations
The demise of economic substantive due process opened the path for
legislatures not only to regulate in the public interest, but also to regulate
for the private benefit of a select few; the path was also open for the
government to restrict access to specified trades or professions.' Since
the demise of economic substantive due process, due process challenges
have been made to legislation that restricts entry into a profession, but the
only one that has been successful thus far was based on a rationale that
resembled procedural due process." Some outrageous examples can be
found, such as state river pilot apprenticeship requirements that operated
to the benefit of relatives and friends of incumbent pilots.' Less
deport aliens with ties to the Communist Party). As used in Gah/an, the phrase may have
referred to the limits on Congress' power implied from the grants of power in Article L
The majority opinion by Frankfurter, however, is a masterpiece of obscurity and seems
to misstate the holding of the case it cited. The reference to substantive due process reads,
"In light of the expansion of the concept of substantive due process as a limitation upon
all powers of Congress, even the war power, see Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.,
251 U.S. 146, 155 [1919] .... " The discussion at page 155 of Hamilton, which does not
mention the phrase "due process" but relates to Congress' power to adopt reasonable rules
under the war power, is the basis of the argument of plaintiff's counsel and is squarely
rejected by the Court.
- Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 127 (1965) (holding that the three-judge
court requirement does not apply to federal-state statutory conflicts).
" Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1951); Lincoln Fed. Labor
Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949) (law providing that
workers could not be denied employment because of failure to join union did not violate
rights of unions or employees); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 398
(1937) (upholding state law setting minimum wages for women).
, See SMGAN, supra note 3, at 184-203; Walter Gellhom, The Abuse of Oca tion-
al Licensing, 44 U. CHL L. REv. 6 (1976) (discussing licensing regulations that restrict
entry into certain trades or professions).
"Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973) (ruling that Alabama licensing
procedures were subject to challenge because the licensing board members had a
pecuniary interest in the proceedings).
62 Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilots Comm'r, 330 U.S. 552, 562-63 (1946); see
McCloskey, s=pra note 2, at 46.
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extreme examples include the operation of state-granted monopolies,'
regulations limiting product innovation," restrictive actions by profes-
sional cartels such as peer certification boards in the medical profes-
sion,65 and city franchising of "quasi" utilities such as cable television
companies .' many of which have been challenged under federal
antitrust laws as well as constitutional theories. 67
' See California Retail Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1980) (providing a two-part test for immunity and then holding that the test did not
apply); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 346, 351 (1943) (holding that a state program for
marketing produce does not violate anitrust laws or the Commerce Clause). See generally
John F. Hart, "Sovereign" State Policy and State Action Antitrust Immunity, 56 FORDHAM
L. REV. 535, 541-49 (1988) (discussing the state action doctrine).
I See Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc. 486 U.S. 492, 495 (1988)
(effort to limit use of new products under the guise of state standards).
' Pinhas v. Summit Health, 111 S. Ct. 1842 (1991) (ruling that peer review board,'s
attempts to exclude a physician from practice because he did not follow an unnecessary,
costly procedure were not protected from antitrust immunity).
"Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488, 488 (1986) (holding that
Los Angeles' refusal to grant franchise rights because petitioner did not participate in an
auction for a single franchise and the utility company's refusal to grant conduit space
violated First Amendment rights); Community Communications v. City of Boulder, 455
U.S. 40, 48 (1982) (holding that a city's moratorium ordinance restricting the expansion
of a cable television company is not exempt from antitrust laws).
' Arguments challenging state regulation of public utility rates are being made in
a more sophisticated fashion than they were during the New Deal era. See Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989) (using eminent domain and jurisdictional
arguments). As the Court said in Duquesne:
One of the elements always relevant to setting the rate ... is the retur
investors expect given the risk of the enterprise. The risks a utility faces are in
large part defined by the rate methodology because utilities are virtually always
public monopolies dealing in an essential service, and so relatively immune to
the usual market risks. Consequently, a State's decision to arbitrarily switch
back and forth between methodologies in a way which required investors to
bear the risk of bad investments at some times while denying them the benefit
of good investments at others would raise serious constitutional questions. But
the instant case does not present this question.
Id. at 314 (citations omitted).
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion, joined by Justices White and O'Connor, indicated
that there may be some limits on the methodology that a state can use in setting rates:
[Wihile "prudent investment! (by which I mean capital reasonably expended to
meet the utility's legal obligation to assure adequate service), need not be taken
into account as such in ratemaking formulas, it may need to be taken into
account in assessing the constitutionality of the particular consequences
produced by those formulas. We cannot determine whether the payments a
utility has been allowed to collect constitute a fair return on investment, and
thus whether the government's action is confiscatory, unless we agree upon•
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The river pilot case presents the best argument for resurrection of
some form of economic substantive due process. Today, the Court might
decide the case differently under the heading of equal protection, although
nominally the rubric of "rational basis' would be the same under either
equal protection or substantive due process.' The "rational" basis that
the state would put forward is that a river pilot is well suited to select his
apprentices from those close to him, because they, by relation or
association, have some understanding of the profession. One who asks
even the most trivial questions about this rationale, however, can see that
the understanding of the duties of a riverboat pilot provides no assurance
of skills and that there are innumerable ways of providing training for
those who do not possess the proper association or relation to an existing
pilot. The restriction in this case would thus be both over-inclusive and
under-inclusive, 9 and one might conclude that the legislature has
performed an irrational act. The act is quite rational, however, when
viewed from the perspective of existing river pilots and their families.
Thus, the river pilot statute is an example of special interest legislation
masquerading under the guise of protecting the public interest. While this
fact alone does not seem to make the Supreme Court believe that a statute
is unconstitutional," special interest legislation that invades a protected
area might be declared unconstitutional Were the right of livelihood
recognized as constitutionally protected, then the case could be decided
on due process grounds.
Many other restrictions on entry into markets have more plausibility
than the river pilot example. Licensing requirements in many professions
depend not only on passage of a test, but also on certain educational
requirements. Many states disqualify a person from practicing law, even
what the relevant '"investmenf is. For that purpose, all prudently incurred
investment may well have to be counted.
Id. at 620. See generally John N. Drbak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The
ConsWitutional Limits on Utility Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REv. 65 (1985) (discussing
Supreme Court ratemaking cases).
' C. New Orleans v. Duke, 427 U.S. 297, 304 (1976) (upholding grandfathering
exemption of two existing street vendors from new ordinance outlawing street vending).
See Joseph Tussnan & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
CAL. L. REV. 341, 348, 351 (1949) (discussing liberty and property rights under the Equal
Protection Clause).
" See TRIE, supra note 2, § 6-7 (discussing the Supreme Court's tolerance of state
restrictions that purport to enhance transportation safety, even if the restrictions in reality
boost local economies).
7' See. id. § 6-25 (explaining the doctrine of preemption by stating that any state
legislation in an area where federal legislation has "occupied the field" is deemed invalid).
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if he has passed the bar examination, if his law school has failed to
receive American Bar Association approval.' The rationale is that the
bar examination cannot measure all of a person's necessary skills and
knowledge, so the school must be relied upon to screen for the rest.'
The claimed rationality is stretched to the limit, however, in the case of
two people who both graduate from unapproved schools, take the bar, and
then wait while one school gains approval, but the other does not.'
Even apprenticeship requirements in some professions, such as
medicine75 and architecture,' arguably could be a means of obtaining
cheap labor and limiting access to the profession. Yet, apprenticeships in
these professions are at least available for all who meet the educational
requirements. Some less "learned" professions require apprenticeships that
can be served only by someone lucky enough to land a job with an
existing licensee to work virtually for free for the requisite period of
time.' Proving that these apprenticeships serve the same function as an
explicit training or educational program is as difficult as proving that they
do not serve such functions.
The public purpose behind a market entry restriction in the form of
professional licensure should be the protection of the public from
incompetent practitioners of the art. Therefore, river pilots should be
required to know the river in the same way that lawyers are required to
know at least some of the law, because the public relying on the services
of these professionals cannot be expected to determine for themselves if
the professionals are competent. Indeed, passengers on a riverboat, even
if they could gauge the relative competence of available pilots, are not in
a position to choose the pilot. One difference among these various market
' Application of Thomas J. Courtney for Admission to the Bar, 294 A.2d 569, 570
(Conn. 1972). But see Bennett v. State Bar of Nev., 746 P.2d 143, 147 (Nev. 1987)
(permitting students of unaccredited law schools to take the bar upon a showing that the
education received was 'functionally equivalent" to that received at ABA accredited
schools).
' The ABA approval process is then adopted by the states as a measure of the
quali of the education received. In re Application of Nort, 605 P. 2d 627, 630 (Nev.
1980) (refusing to waive bar requirements of attending an ABA accredited school).
' See Bennett, 746 P.2d at 147 (graduates of Old College may take bar examination
but cannot be sworn in until school receives ABA approval).
7' See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-31(b) (1953 & Supp. 1993); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 311.571(d) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990 & Supp. 1992).
76 See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-3-4(1) (1953 & Supp. 1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:146D(3) (West 1988).
'n UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-9-5 (fimeral service); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 316.-90
(Michie/Bobbs Merrill 1990) (funeral service); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-12-60 (acupunc-
ture); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-5a-302(5) (Supp. 1993) (podiatrists).
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entry restrictions, from river pilot nepotism to electrician apprenticeships,
is the degree to which the requirement can actually be expected to
perform the function of protecting the public from an incompetent
practitioner. Another difference is the degree to which the restriction
limits the aspirant's opportunity to meet the requirements of the restric-
tion, thus thwarting one's expectation of entering that trade or profession
and affecting one's right of livelihood. Some substantive due process
analyses focus on interest group theories to demonstrate that the
perversion of the political process creates the necessity for judicial
protections." Preservation of the political process may be a value
underlying substantive due process, but this value is not easily translated
into judicial review because the interest group's activities are irrelevant
to the public interests.79
The public purpose behind market entry restrictions to commercial
entities such as public utilities' is more complex, dealing both with the
prevention of the waste that might result from the competition for a
"natural monopoly" and with the quality of service to the public.
Technological developments have made some "natural" monopolies no
longer natural, particularly in the communications industry, and federal
antitrust laws have resolved some of the anticompetitive issues in this
arena.' Other related issues have been approached under the rubric of
federalism by speaking of state interference with interstate commerce,
typified by state regulation that either seeks to benefit local industry at
the expense of the rest of the nation or unduly burdens interstate
commerce.' Finally, some regulations require certain behavior on the
part of a regulated utility that is wholly unrelated to the reasons -for the
- See Wonmell, supra note 8, at 105-11.
79 See infra notes 343-51 and accompanying text.
, See United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 552 F. Supp. 131,
135 (D.D.C. 1982) (analyzing the effect on the public interest of breaking up AT&T),
affidsub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). See generally Dennis
W. Carlton, Economic Goals and Remedies of the AT&T Modified Final Judgment, 71
GEO. L. 1497 (Aug. 1983) (discussing the AT&T break up).
" On the opposite sick of the coin, rate regulation of public utilities is being
challenged once again on the ground of interference with 'Tree enterprise," although the
arguments are much more sophisticated than they were 100 years ago and tend to
emphasize.a putative public interest in competitive pricing. Drobak, supra note 67, at 106,
111.
' See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945) (discussing the
disallowance of safety regulation that would have local employment benefits); Pike v.
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (stating that local economic boosterism,
while an acceptable state objective, must be measured by whether it unduly burdens
interstate commerce).
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regulatory process, such as attempted controls on billing inserts.' While
an overt attention to substantive due process might not work better than
the current hodgepodge of doctrines, at least everyone would then
understand the level of scrutiny that the Court would apply.
D. Public Employment and Benefits
It is now commonplace to speak of property interests in public
employment and benefits, although the definition of the property interest
has undergone some transformation under the Rehnquist Court.O The
basis for recognition of the "new property" is essentially the degree of
reliance that modem society places on individual relationships with
government.' Jobs, licenses and financial benefits that take the place of
income are deserving of procedural protection in order both to minimize
the risk of governmental error and abuse as well as to provide a vehicle
for judicial review of agency decisions."
When a court reviews agency action to guard against arbitrary or
capricious action on the part of an agency, that court is exercising a
function that is somewhere between procedural and substantive due
process. The typical levels of inquiry by the reviewing court will proceed
from insisting on an adequate basis of evidence to meet the relevant
statutory standard, to checking the appropriateness of agency interpreta-
tion of its statutory mandate, and, finally, to insisting on a coherent
reasoning process by the agency.' Although these steps can be concept-
' Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980) (holding
that an order prohibiting the inclusion of inserts in monthly utility bills violates freedom
of speech).
4 See Henry P. Monaghan, Of"Libery" and 'Poperty", 62 CORNEL L. REV. 405,
438 (1977) (discussing criteria for defining "libW" and "propert).
" See id. at 435-36; Charles A. Reich, The New Propery, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 739-46
(1964); William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Fight-Privilege Distinction in
Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1462-63 (1968); c. Edward L. Rubin, Due
Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV. 1044, 1047 (1984) (urging 'focus
on the fairness of the governmental action" rather than on the interest of the individual).
"Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative
Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 60, 84 (1976) (arguing
that the standard for determining a property right in employment is too high); Wayne
McConnack, The Purpose ofDue Process. Fair Hearing or Vehicle for Judicial Review?,
52 TEX L. REV. 1257, 1266-67 (1974) (discussing bias in administrative proceedings and
how it affects the Court's ability to establish due process through a judicial review).
" See, e.g., RiCHARD S. PIERCE Er AL., ADmNISTRATIVE LAw AND PRocEss § 7.5,
§ 8.3.3d (2d ed. 1985) (discussing review of agency reasoning process); BERNARD
SCHWARtZ, AnDiDnTRiinE LAw §§ 10.2, 10.4, 10.6 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the
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ualized as a form of procedural due process review and some courts have in
fact used substantive due process as the descriptor,' the usual characterization
of this type of review is mere statutory enforcement.
Yet, what if the statutory standard itself is capricious? If the standard is
dictated simply by the need to conserve public resources for other pur-
poses-for example, by raising the threshold for eligibility in a welfare
program-the court is not in a good position to make a different determi-
nation.' IC at the other extreme, the statutory or regulatory standard punishes
people for exercising their protected political rights, the First Amendment and
related values provide substantive protections. In between these extremes are
instances in which the statutory or regulatory standard unjustifiably intrudes
upon someone ability to earn a living or pursue a chosen profession. At least
one such case has resulted in the striking down of an employment restriction
on due process groundsY
The flip side of a public benefits problem is the impact on the public
whose resources are taken to provide the benefit. While many view the power
to take resources through taxation and redistribute them through so-called
entitlements programs as raising no fundamental constitutional problem, some
types ofdistnbutions are troubling. When government provides limited access
to a finite, publicly owned resource, such as public lands, the redistribution
excludes the nonrecipient of the benefit from access to the publicly owned
resource. On this basis, federal subsidies in the form of timber contracts,
grazing permits, and mining claims offend many economists because they are
inefficient uses of a limited resource, often resulting in waste of the resource
itself and lacking a concomitant return to the public owner. Yet, as Judge
Posner urges, the constitutional task is interpretation, not construction of
someones ideal economic kingdom.9'
procedure for review of an agency decision and how the issues are to be limited).
n Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 308 (1975) (reviewing a lower court decision
that characterized the expulsion of students without a showing of evidence as violative
of the students' right to "substantive due process"); Gibson v. Benyhill, 411 U.S. 564
(1972) (reviewing a lower court decision that characterized its procedure for agency
review as "substantive due process").
19 There have been a few challenges to governmental distribution decisions on the
ground that they are simply irrational and arbitrary, but thus far the Court has been able
to come up with a rationale to explain the legislative determination. Schwelker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221, 236 (1981).
90 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 646 (1974) (striking down
employer's requirement that a teacher leave her job due to her pregnancy). Even if this
case had been decided on equal protection grounds, the review by the Court would have
been identical to the rationality review of the Lochner era. See infra notes 171-77 and
accompanying text.
9 Posner, supra note 41, at 20 (noting that the 'first task of interpretation is
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E. Dimensions of the Post-Lochner Problem
There are both institutional and economic policy reasons for the
Court's abandonment of substantive review. The institutional reasons
relate to the judiciary's inability to enact rules dealing with the variety of
relationships that might be affected by its ruling that a single regulatory
measure is invalid. The Court realized in 1937 that each aspect of
economic life is necessarily interlocked and intertwined with a host of
others and that overturning one regulation could upset many others in a
fashion that the Court could neither predict nor cure.' The economic
reasons track the same, phenomenon. The Court may not have been wrong
in asking the questions that Lochner prompted, but it certainly did not
have sufficient information upon which to reach the conclusions that it
did in some of the cases that followed. Today, we understand much more
about the degree to which one person's exercise of "freedom" affects
others and gives rise to the state's interest in protecting the freedom of
those others. Thus, the complexity of the interlocked twentieth century
economy provides clues to both the institutional and the economic
reasons for the Court's reversal in 1937.-" We might now, however,
conclude that the Court's abdication was too complete.
The rise of substantive due process review was associated with the
individualism and laissez-faire philosophies of the nineteenth century,
although its origins border on being ancient.' The heart of the doctrine
was the belief that the state had no business interfering in the decisions
of the individual, including individual employer or employees, absent a
showing of harm to someone else flowing from the individual's deci-
sion.95 In applying the doctrine, the Supreme Court distinguished
between decisions made by businesses "affected with a public inter-
est," in which the impact on others was obvious, and other business
or commercial decisions, which were thought to affect only the individu-
als involved.
interpretation, rather than the choice of optimal policies).
'2 See TRMBE, supra note 2, § 8-6.
See id. § 8-6 to 8-7.
See id. § 8-1; see generally Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Backgromd
of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REv. 149, 365 (1928-29) (discussing the
origins of judicial review in light of Lord Coke's writings and the Magna Carta).
" Charles A. Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law, in NoMos XVIIL DUE
PRocEss 3, 6-9 (J. Roland Pennock & John. W. Chapman eds., 1977).
-Budd v. New York, 143 U.S. 517, 533 (1892) (ruling that use of state police
power to regulate a business does not violate the Constitution).
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The demise of the doctrine was associated with the growth of
collective action and welfare economics of the twentieth century. As
economic life expanded and became more interlocked, it became obvious
to the judges of the 1930s that individual actions in the economic arena
necessarily affected others who were apparently unconnected to the
transaction being regulated. For example, when wage and hour laws were
first promulgated, the Court looked only at the relationship between
employer and employee, concluding that there was not a sufficient threat
of harm to the employee to warrant governmental interference in the
personal liberty of either.97 During the Depression, it became clear that
the wages and hours of one employee significantly impacted others
outside the employer-employee relationship, 8 creating what the econo-
mists began to call externalities.9 Broadening the focus from employer
and employee to include others, such as out-of-state banks that make
loans to farmers who sell goods to the employee, justified regulating the
wages and hours of the employee regardless of whether the employer's
actions represented a threat to the employee.
In examining the reasonableness of a restriction on the individual in
favor of a collective goal, such as licensing of a medical practitioner, the
court must ascertain the public benefits sought by the regulation and
determine whether the method chosen (means) fairly accomplishes a
public objective (ends). 1°° This judgment by the Court has both factual
and political elements. In the 1940s, courts purported to abandon the
protection and pursuit of inherent economic rights out of a claimed sense
of institutional incompetence for the political judgment."' The next
section of this Article deals with how courts immediately began
reinstituting that review when more particularized expressions of
individual liberties seemed to require it."
A quick review of the post-Lochner period reveals at least two levels
of the post-Lochner problem. One is the need for constitutional tools to
Miller, sipra note 95, at 33; 1 RoNALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NORWAK,
TREATaE ON CONsiT ONA L ." SUBSTANCE AND PRocEDUR § 4.6, at 384 (2d ed.
1992).
" See TRIBE, supra note 2, at 239.
"F 'Eeraitiaes MV costs imposed or benefits conferred on others as a result of an
individual's activities that he is not required to (in the case of costs) or able to (in the case
of benefits) take into account in his decision-making." DAvID W. BARNES & LYNN W.
STOUT, THE ECONOMIC ANALYsIS OF TORT LAw 22 (1992).
"0 TME, spra note 2, § 5-5 (discussing the "cumulative effect' principle and how
Congress has used it to jusi certain reguatory legislation).
101 See SIEGAN, supra note 60, at 185-88.
'2 See infra notes 106-80 and accompanying text
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deal with the anticompetitive effects of unregulated monopolies. One
possible answer to this problem would have been to say that there is
nothing unconstitutional about the unregulated monopoly. Because the
unregulated monopoly was considered a violation of basic rights of
liberty even prior to the Constitution,"°3 however, the Supreme Court has
felt compelled to derive protections against it from sources in the
Constitution other than substantive due process.1" The second level of
the problem is the need for substantive definitions of property and liberty
in the context of public employment and benefits. This need leads to
defining rights that will receive some degree of protection from legislative
invasions under the Due Process Clause-a form of substantive due
process. Although a potpourri of doctrines has arisen to meet these needs,
the assortment obscures the basic need for a substantive definition of
economic rights and perpetuates the dichotomous separation of personal
from economic liberties."'
II. THE PosT-NEw DEAL RESURRECTION
OF SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS
After articulating its abandonment of what came to be known as
substantive due process, the Supreme Court began to develop protections
for similar interests through the use of other doctrines.'" The two
principal areas in which this occurred were the protection of the rights to
public employment and benefits and a more diffused area, the protection
of employment-related interests. Looking at these two areas permits one
to see how far the Court has gone in resurrecting the substantive due
process scheme. There is at least one unenuinerated economic right,
which can be denominated the "right of livelihood," that seems to emerge
in all of these divergent areas.
A. The Procedural Needfor Substantive Definitions of Economic Rights
The Supreme Court's handling of a variety of "procedural" due
process cases shows that there is some need for a federal substantive
definition of rights of property and liberty. The Court, despite frequent
protestations to the contrary, does review substantive state law decisions
10 See infra note 270 and accompanying text.
104 See infra notes 156-79 and accompanying text.
'0' Wayne McConnac*, Institutional Competence and the Function of Rights, WASH.
& LEE L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 1994).
106 See Miller, supra note 95, at 32-34.
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for fairness and rationality and, in the course of that review, determines
the adequacy of state definitions of economic rights.
1. Public Employment
Public employment cases both illustrate the difficulty of defining
property and liberty interests and articulate a judicially recognized right
to pursue a trade or occupation. The two 1972 teacher cases, Board of
Regents v. Roth".7 and Perry v. Sindermann,"'  held that the existence
of a property interest initially turned on whether the underlying law, state
law and practice in this instance, created a claim of entitlement that could
be argued at a proceeding equipped with due process." If state law had
made it clear that the applicant had, at best, a "mere expectancy" or, at
worst, no expectation at all, then there would be no claim to present and
thus no need for due process."' The presence or absence of a legally
cognizable claim is roughly the same question as whether an issue is
committed to agency discretion and thus not reviewable under the
Administrative Procedure Act."' The question in both instances is
whether there is law to apply to the dispute before the court.
The claimant also has a hlberty interest protectable by due process
when an institution takes action affecting the claimant's "good name,
reputation, honor or integrity."" 2  This limitation arose from earlier
cases in which the claimant was denied an opportunity for a hearing
before being fired unless the reasons for firing would have operated to
prevent employment opportunities in the future."' The only apparent
reason for labelling current expectations as property and future employ-
107 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (ruling that "[t]lhe Fourteenth Amendment does not require
opportunity for a hearing prior to the nomenewal of a no.ntenured state teacher's contract
unless he can show that the nonrenewal deprived 'him of an interest in 'libert or that he
had a 'property' interest in continued employment").
'- 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (holding that a nontenured teacher dismissed for criticizing
the administration must show loss of a liberty or property right before he can have a
Fourteenth Amendment claim).
Roth, 408 U.S. at 578.
110 Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 603.
".. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1988) (nonreview if "agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law").
" Roth, 408 U.S. at 573.
'"See Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886, 896 (1961) (reasoning that petitioner's employment at military installations,
rather than her interest in employability, was denied).
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ability as liberty is the simplicity of understanding created by the
distinction.
How did the Court find the definition of employability to be a liberty
interest? The answer is a familiar, if not a terribly satisfying, one. The
liberty interest stems from the shared values that influential thinkers have
held concerning our political structures and resides in the Constitution
because the Court, through its powers of interpretation, says that it does.
The interest's path to acceptability has followed a familiar course. First,
the Court mentioned the right of employability in the dictum of an
unrelated case."" Then, in Roth, the Court stated that if the right had
been violated in that case, the holding of Roth would have been
different."5 Curiously, no case has been presented in which the Court
could take the explicit step of holding that a specific governmental act
had violated the right of employability."' Imagining in this day and age
that the right would not be protected through the requirements of
procedural due process is difficult" 7 Protecting the right of employabil-
ity in this fashion places the right in much the same position as the right
to pursue a trade or occupation, which is protectable against legislative
policy judgments through substantive due process.
The other feature of Roth and Sindermann that bears on the problem
of protecting the plaintiff's economic rights is the difficulty of defining
the property interest. In Roth and Sindermann the Court took pains to
emphasize that the entitlement on which the constitutional values then
operated was created and defined by the underlying law of the state."8
114 Laberty includes 'not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to conitract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to many, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of conscience." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
Roth, 408 U.S. at 578; see McElroy, 367 U.S. at 896.
A potential case was presented in Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1987), but
the claimant alleged no restriction on fture employability from the denial of a security
clearance. The issue here was whether a denial of a security clearance was reviewable by
a Merit Systems Protection Board. Id. at 520. The Court held that it was not reviewable.
Id. at 534.
"' Arguably, the Court enforced the right to a'!nme-clearing hearing" inbackhanded
fashion. Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 622 (1980) (holding that a
city did not have good-faith immunity from a damage action for violation of the right).
,' The Court in Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, stated:
Property interests, of course, are not created by the Constitution. Rather,
they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law-rules
or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of
entitlement to those benefits.
418 [Vol 82
RIGHT OF LIVELIHOOD
A number of commentators decried the possibility of rendering the
constitutional protection a nullity by allowing the state to define the
entitlement out of existence.'" Some writers pointed out that because
the greater power to define the entitlement must also include the lesser
power to define the procedures by which it is protected, the Court had
produced a nonresultY0 Approaches for solving this dilemma include
requiring the government to state judicially reviewable reasons for every
detrimental action," leaving state law out of the formulation entire-
ly,m and abandoning the field by allowing the legislature full rein to
define both claims and the procedures for their protection."
The latter approach was attempted by a plurality of the Court in
Arnett v. Kennedy,' in which a federal employee threatened with
dismissal for cause was found not to have a right to a pre-termination
hearing. ' Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion expressed the view that
Congress could have left the employee dismissible at will."6 In choos-
ing to confer the benefit of employment security, Congress could leave
the employee to enforce the benefit through judicial, rather than
See also Sindemann, 408 U.S. at 603 (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("The relationship
between a state institution and one of its teachers is essentially a matter of state concern
and state law.").
Thomas C. Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive Rights, in NOMOS XVI]I,
DuE PRocEss 182, 189-90 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977)
(discussing the morality of procedural due process in light of substantive rights under the
Constitution); Dougas Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort To
Make the Due Process Clauses Nonjustcable, 60 TEx L. REv. 875, 887-89 (1982)
(discussing attacks on the judicial enforcement of Due Process Clauses in light of
legislatively proscribed procedure). See Martin H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall,
Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALE L. 455,
474-75 (1986) (discussing the requirements of procedural due process).
12 See injra note 119.
1 Robert L. Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative
Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. Cm. L. REV. 60, 77-87 (1976)
(discussing procedural safeguards for the protection of property interests).
m Mark Tushnt The Newer Property: Suggeston for the Revival ofSubstantive Due
Process, 1975 SuP. Cr. REV. 261, 262-63 (discussing the '!new" rights that should be
recognized as a method to use in the Court's andysis).
w Frank H. Eastero Substance and Due Process, 1982 SuP. CT. REV. 85, 108
(discussing the rationale for allowing the courts to retain the ability to determine the
procedures while letting the legislature deternime the substantive rights).
" 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
sId at 163.
"4 Id. at 148.
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administrative, proceedings. 7 Otherwise, Congress might very well
decide not to create the benefit at allm
The Rehnquist pure positivist approach to the definition of property
interests would render the Due Process Clause a nullity just as the same
approach would render the takings clause a nullity if applied to real
estate.' Nevertheless, Rehnquist's approach seemed to command a
majority of the Court in Bishop v. Wood,"3 in which the Court upheld
the dismissal of a "permanent" city employee without a hearing on the
ground that state law created a claim of entitlement only to the proce-
dures specified and thus did not require a hearing."' The Arnett
positivist position was squarely rejected, however, in Cleveland Board of
Education v. Loudermill," when a majority of the Court "explained"
that state law defines the claim but federal law determines the procedures
to be followed in terminating the claim."
Loudermill restores the conundrum that Arnett attempted to eliminate.
A sensible argument for the Arnett "bitter with the sweet" approach is
127 Id. at 149-50.
12 "[W]here the grant of a substantive right is ixtricably intertwined with the
limitations on the procedures which ame to be employed in determining that right, a
litigant ... must take the bitter with the sweet." Id. at 153-54.
1 Redish & Marshall, supra note 120, at 467-68 (discussing the legislalure's ability
to define the substance of a right as well as the procedure for due process). If applied to
life and liberty, the pure positivist approach would immunize even the death penalty from
due process requirements by defining life as forfeitable at will to the state. Laycock,
supra note 120, at 881.
" 426 U.S. 341 (1976) (holding that dismissal of a city employee did not violate a
property interest).
1 Id. at 347.
470 U.S. 532 (1985) (holding that where a state statute defines a property interest
in employment, a terminated employee has a right to a hearing under the Due Process
Clause).
133 [IUt is settled that the "bitter with the sweet" approach misconceives the
constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. The
point is staightforwar& the Due Process Clause provides that certain substan-
tive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to
constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure
are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere
tautology. "Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its
deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process 'is
conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the
legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment,
it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once
conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards."
Id. at 541 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 167 (1974)).
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that allowing the state complete latitude in the defining of employment
claims is not likely to be detrimental so long as the state must grant some
definitional security in order to attract employees. Even if one accepted
this line of factual premises, however, the Arnelt holding would still
constitute a doctrinal dilemma-allowing the state to determine whether
a property interest exists by defining a benefit to exist at will. To avoid
the dilemma, either of two approaches is possible. First, the Court could
hold that willy-nilly granting of benefits without any substantive
definition is itself a violation of due process.TM The second and far
more straightforward approach-to make the method of terminating a
claim of entitlement a matter of federal substantive definition-is where
the Loudermill result should lead. The next set of cases bears on whether
this is what the Court has actually adopted.
2. Tennination of Claims
Closely related to the definition of claims and procedures is the
"procedural" due process challenge to termination of existing claims. In
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 35 the Illinois Supreme Court interpret-
ed state law to deny a state agency of jurisdiction to hear an employment
discrimination claim that had not been heard within 120 days after
presentation to the agency without any regard for any fault on the part of
the claimant. The United States Supreme Court held that this rule was a
violation of procedural due process because it failed to provide the
claimant with an opportunity for the claim to be heard."M The termina-
tion issue, however, does not fit neatly within the category of procedural
due process.
Assume that the state legislature had defined the claim and stated that
the claim existed for 120 days and no longer. The state would have
L A corollary to this holding would be that the granting of benefits on the basis of
an umeviewable judgment triggers only the question of whether improper standards have
been employed and not the question of whether a claim of entitlement could be supported
at a hearing. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (holding that a CIA employee's
constitutional claim, which was not the entitlement to the job but the invasion of a
protected interest in an alleged privacy of lifestyle, was entitled to judicial review in the
face of a statute barring judicial review).
" 455 U.S. 422, 427 (1982) (holding that allowing a state agency to deprive itself
of jurisdiction through its own fault violated the complainant's due process rights).
m The Court was careful to note that not every civil litigant is entitled to a hearing
on the merits in every case and pointed out permissible state barriers predicated on
actions within the control of the claimant, such as statutes of limitations and procedural
and evidentiary rules. Id. at 437.
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placed the burden on the claimant to get his or her claim processed within the
120-day limit just as the "procedural" rule in Logan did, but the state's
limitation would have been contained within the very definition of the claim
itself. Surely, there would be no distinction between this approach and the
approach of the state agency in Logan. The defect in Logan was actually one
of defining the claim more than the procedure by which it was adjudicated
or, actually, not adjudicated. The Court in Logan hinted that while termination
of an existing remedy, such as by diversion of current malpractice cases to
an administrative agency without adversary process, might be a violation of
due process, the redefiiition of the claim itself ordinarily would not be.37
The Court has also allowed challenges to state statutes of limitations for
terminating paternity claims of illegitimate children after an unreasonably
short period of time." The Court's analysis in these cases purports to be
based on equal protection, but there is no group being treated differently from
another group on the basis of the statute of limitations. Children born to
married women need not bring paternity actions; it is the underlying
distinction, not the statute of limitations, that creates the different treatment.
The period of limitations is being examined for reasonableness, not different-
ness. 39 Thus, the question asked by the Court is the same one that would
be asked under due process analysis, namely, whether the state has needs that
outweigh the needs of the child.1
4
When the legislature itself redefines a right as happened in Martinez v.
California, ' the result is not reviewable by the courts, though arguably not
455 U.S. at 432-33. The Logan Court explained Martinez v. State of California,
444 U.S. 277, 282 (1980) (holding that a legislative provision for state tort immunity for
parole board members did not violate the due process rights of a girl murdered by a
parolee), as upholding
a California statute granting officials immunity from certain types of state tort
claims. We acknowledged that the grant of immunity arguably did deprive the
plaintiffs of a protected property interest. But they were not thereby deprived
of property without due process, just as a welfare recipient is not deprived of
due process when the legislature adjusts benefit levels. In each case, the
legislative determination provides all the process that is due ....
Logan, 455 U.S. at 432-33 (citations omitted).
"' Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that Pennsylvania's six-year
statute of limitations violates the Equal Protection Clause); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S.
91, 101 (1982) (invalidating a Texas statute that barred suits filed more than one year
after the child was born).
39 Clark; 486 U.S. at 463 (failing to state whose equal protection rights were violated
in striking down Pennsylvania statute).
140 See id. at 461.
14
' Mainez, 444 U.S. at 277 (holding that a legislative provision for state tort
immunity for parole board members did not violate the due process rights of a girl
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for the reason given by the Martinez Court Martinez involved a claim by the
parents of a fifteen-year-old girl, who had been murdered by a parolee,
against the California parole board.42 The Supreme Court held that a bill
subsequently passed by the California State Legislature granting immunity to
the board was not a violation of the decedent's due process rights."" The
Marinez Court explained the situation as an instance where the legislature
had given all the process that was due;1 ' this rationale would make all
legislative judgments exempt from substantive review no matter how
damaging they might be to a substantively protected interest. Perhaps the real
reason for the outcome of Martnez was that no substantive claim existed
following the legislative redefinition that created the state immunity. When
legislative redefinition is carried out after the claim arose, then a variation on
the "vested rights" doctrine14 of the nineteenth century would produce an
invalidation under the Due Process Clause.
The Court has built a bridge between substantive and procedural due
process that, at the least, does not allow the state to define a claim in a way
that makes it impossible for the claimant to achieve adjudication of the claim.
Whether the bridge accomplishes anything more remains to be seen, but at
least we know that the procedural and substantive compartments are not as
watertight as prior Court language might have suggested.
In the modem positive state, the assurance that benefits will receive some
degree of definition from the state is present in a number of other settings. In
welfare and licensing, for example, mandating an administrative agency to
grant a benefit without providing at least some definition of the criteria under
which the license or benefit is to be granted would leave the agency no
guidance as to what to do with its largesse. In such a situation, at least the
agency, if not the legislature, will develop criteria to govern the exercise of
discretion. Those criteria will then become the definition of the property
interest held by grantees.
3. Postdeprivation Process and the Takings Issue
The main difficulty in administering due process is that of identifyling
some type of curtailments in the level of process due. In a backwards fashion,
murdered by a parolee).
'
1Id. at 277.
' Id. at 281.
'"Id. at 283-85; Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 432-33 (1982)
(noting that the legislative determination concerning creation of official immunities
satisfied due process).
14 See generally WIAM G. MYER, VESTED RIGHTS 1-56 (1891) (providing a
general discussion of vested rights).
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this phenomenon produces a reduction in the level of property interest.
For example, in Parratt v. Taylor,'" prison personnel lost a prisoner's
item of personal property somewhere in the prison mailroom. The
Supreme Court held that while there was a clear taking of the property
involved, all that due process required was an opportunity for the convict
to present his claim somewhere within the official structure of the
prison.' 7 The existence of a post-taking remedy was held to satisfy due
process because the random and unauthorized nature of negligent acts by
state employees makes it difficult for the state to provide a meaningful
hearing before the deprivation takes place." The Court subsequently
extended the rationale of Parralt to intentional takings by government
officials when the Court perceived that the defendant was the state rather
than the miscreant officer.49 The Court then held that the state could
not predict and provide predeprivation redress for the intentional
wrongdoing."s In Zinermon v. Burch,' however, the Court reached
a different result when faced with an intentional evasion of an existing
state procedure regarding post-confinement mental illness commitment.
The Court in Zinermon held that the intentional conduct was state action
because the state could, and indeed had, forecast the possible need for
summary action and had created a mechanism for protecting the
individual's interest even after the initial confinement.52
An interesting question that remains is, What happens when the state
postdeprivation remedy is pursued but results in a denial of relief to the
claimant? If the federal constitutional guarantee does not afford a judicial
'46 451 U.S. 527, 530 (1981), overruled by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
'4 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-41.
48 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541.
'9 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding that an opportunity to have
the claim heard within the prison structure satisfied due process in cases of intentional
taking of property by prison officials).
110 The Court stated:
The underlying rationale of Parratt is that when deprivations of property are
effected through random and unauthorized conduct of a state employee,
predeprivation procedures are simply "impracticable" since the state cannot
know when such deprivations will occur. . . . The state can no more anticipate
and control in advance the random and unauthorized intentional conduct of its
employees than it can anticipate similar negligent conducL
Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
... 494 U.S. 113, 125-27 (1990) (challenging the admission ofthe allegedly medicated
and disoriented respondent under the voluntary commitment statute as a violation of due
process because committing officials knew or should have known that respondent was
incapable of giving consent).
" Id. at 127.
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remedy for the taking, then it is as if the property interest were redefined
to consist only of the opportunity to present a claim. If the Court means
that it will not entertain an additional lawsuit after the state denies a
claim for money damages, then the Court has defined the underlying
substantive property out of any separate constitutional existence because
the Court is saying that the opportunity to make the claim is all the right
that exists. On the other hand, it may well be that a denial of relief by the
state triggers a subsequent federal action because the Court merely held
that "the state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or
refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy."'' 3 The difficulty
is that we cannot be sure that a "suitable postdeprivation remedy" would
not consist of the opportunity for adjudication even if the claimant lost.
The Court's holdings on preclusion of claims presented to the state would
make it difficult to adjudicate the federal claim after presentation of the
state claim in the state system.154
These cases, which might be called the postdeprivation process cases,
run the risk of recreating a conundrum in which state law can define the
property interest out of existence by defining the conditions under which
the interest will be redressed. Giving the state the opportunity to provide
process after the taking occurs appears to make sense and should have
been the Court's approach to the "temporary takings" in First English
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles 5 Ending the constitutional protection
at the mere providing of process, however, does not make sense. The
providing of process only eliminates the federal damage claim by
.allowing the state to provide redress, either in the form of damages or
invalidation. If the state fails to provide adequate redress, for either
substantive or remedial reasons, then the federal court must make a
determination of whether a compensable taking of property has occurred.
" Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533. The Seventh Circuit has held that intentional takings
may not be the basis for a claim for relief until after the state has denied relief for their
return, but has not indicated that provision of an opportunity for presenting the claim was
itself a complete satisfaction of due process. Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d 1059, 1060-
61 (7th Cir. 1976).
..4 Migra v. Warren City Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 87 (1984) (holding in response
to a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a state court judgment has the same
preclusive effect in federal court that it would have in state court). See generally Robert
H. Smith, Full Faith and Credit and Section 1983: A Reappraisal, 63 N.C. L. REV. 59
(1984) (discussing claim preclusion litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
155 482 U.S. 304, 310 (1987) (holding that "temporary takings," those regulatory
takings which are ultimately invalidated by the courts, require compensation under the
notion of eminent domain).
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4. "Substantive Procedural" Due Process
Gibson v. Benyhill'" involved a challenge to practices of the
Alabama State Board of Optometry, which was established by statute to
license optometrists. An Alabama statute authorized the Board to suspend
or revoke licenses for "unprofessional conduct,"" a term which
included "any acts in his profession declared by the Alabama Optometric
Association to be unethical or contrary to good practice."'" The Board
was required by statute to be composed of members of the Associa-
tion. 59 The Association would not accept as members any optometrists
employed by corporations and declared that it was unprofessional to work
for a corporation."6 When the Board moved to revoke the licenses of
optometrists employed by Lee Optical Co., the Supreme Court, holding
that the effort violated due process because of the economic bias of the
Board members, stated: "It is sufficiently clear from our cases that those
with substantial pecuniary interest in legal proceedings should not
adjudicate those disputes. ' 6 '
The "procedural" defect in Gibson was palpably de minimis. The only
issue that the Board was assigned to adjudicate was the question of
corporate employment, an easily verifiable historical fact." The
offensive part of the state program was the substantive prohibition, and
the sel-serving enforcement mechanism merely served to illustrate for
whose benefit the rule operated.'63 Following Gibson, it might have
been easy to take the next step and decide that regulations excluding
qualified persons from the practice of a profession, particularly persons
attempting to practice that profession in the least expensive fashion, were
a substantive denial of some protected right.
15 411 U.S. 564, 566 (1973).
s ALA. CODE § 206 (1965).
1.6 Gibson, 411 U.S. at 568 n.3.
159 Id. at 570 n.7.
10 Id. at 578. The complaint charged the optometrists with unprofessional conduct for
being employed by a corporation Id.
161 Id. at 579.
" See McCormack, mpra note 86, at 1271. The thrust of my earlier article is that the
bias of the Board seemed an inappropriate rationale and that the Court'sreal concern must
have been that of providing a vehicle for judicial review of the deson. That analysis
still stands to some degree, although now I am adding the standards that a court would
use in reviewing the substantive state rules.
" See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578 (1973) (noting that because the Board
was composed of optometrists in private practice, the Board's actions could serve to
benefit the Board's members).
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The appropriate challenge was presented the very next year, but the Court
declined to take the opportunity. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy v.
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.'" involved a challenge to a state statute prohibit-
ing a corporation from applying for a pharmacy permit unless a majority of
the coporationt stock was held by registered pharmacists actively engaged
in the business itself The Court explicitly overruled an earlier case striking
down a similar law,"6 stating that the earlier case "belongs to that vintage
of decisions which exalted substantive due process by striking down state
legislation which a majority of the Court deemed unwise."'  The Court
reiterated that it no longer adheres to substantive due process as a working
doctrine. 6
7
Both Gibson and North Dakota Pharmacy involved the same basic
problem, the limitation of a profession to unincorporated proprietors. The
argument in favor of the limitation has to do with oversight of the profession-
al activities by members of the profession rather than managers and
shareholders divorced from the profession itself'" The countervailing
argument is that corporate ownership can reduce costs by increasing volume
and bringing more efficient management practices to bear." If this were
all that were involved, then the Court should have left the choice between
these competing economic and professional issues with the legislatures in
Alabama and North Dakota.170 More is involved, however, because the
regulations touch upon the important interest of pursuit of a trade or
profession. It is this aspect of the enforcement mechanism and the Courtt
desire to protect the right to pursue a profession that most plausibly explain
Gibson and North Dakota Pharmacy.
The cardinal difference between the two schemes relates directly to the
substantive rationale for the regulations. North Dakota allowed the corporate
14 414 U.S. 156, 158 (1973).
6 Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105 (1928) (holding unconstitutional a Pennsylvania
statute forbidding a corporation from owning a pharmacy or drug store unless all of its
stockholders were licensed pharmacists).1 North Dakota Pharmacy, 414 U.S. at 164.
'
6
"[lTre due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed that the
Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket when they attempt to suppress
business ... they regard as offensive to the public welfare." Id. at 165 (quoting Lincoln
Union v. Northwestern Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)).
'a Liggett, 278 U.S. at 114 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[A licensed pharmacist] would
be more likely to observe the business with an intelligent eye than a casual investor who
looked only to the standing of the stock in the market.").
' North Dakota Pharmacy, 414 U.S. at 166.
' "Those two opposed views of public policy are considerations for the legislative
choice." Id. at 167.
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form of practice so long as a majority of stock were held by active
practitioners, while Alabama prohibited the corporate form entirely. The
Court found the former restriction substantively acceptable as a limit on
the right of livelihood, while the latter was struck down on an almost
irrelevant procedural ground. The procedural problem simply served to
highlight the degree to which the Alabama structure was a self-serving
framework for one interest group. If these observations accurately
describe what the Court was doing, it is classic substantive due process
analysis in which one case is decided by failure of proof of a public
purpose.
The most solid bridge between procedural and substantive due
process lies across the "irrebuttable presumption!' channel. In Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Supreme Court struck down the
employer's requirement that a school teacher leave her job upon becoming
pregnant. The school board attempted to justify its rule on the ground that
most women become incapable of handling the duties of teaching at some
point late in the pregnancy." The Court looked upon this as imposing
an irrebuttable presumption of unfitness to which the teacher should have
been allowed to make a contrary showing." Although the case could
have been handled as an equal protection problem, involving treatment
of similarly situated people differently on the basis of an irrelevant
criterion, the Court instead treated the case as a due process problem" 4
The problem was not a procedural defect in failing to give the teacher an
opportunity to prove her capacity, but a substantive defect in making the
judgment of unfitness on the basis of inadequate evidence.'75
171 414 U.S. 632, 650 (1974).
172 Id. at 640-42.
'
73 Id. at 644.
174 Id. at 646.
17' Another case which attempted to bridge the gap between procedural and
substantive due process was Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 62 (1978), which involved a challenge to the federal statutory cap on
liability of federally licensed mclear power plants. The challengers argued that the cap
should be subjected to a "more elevated" scrutiny than business regulations because the
interests 'Jeopardized"' by the act were very important: Id. at 62. The Court'sresponse was
that this was "a classic example of an economic regulation" subject to the bare rationality
test. Id. The procedural leg of the argument related to Congress' substitution of a limited
fimed'for recovery in lieu of state tort law remedies. On this part of the challenge, the
Court found the find to be a fair and reasonable substitute for less certain remedies.
However, Duke Power was not a good vehicle for attempting to make the bridge, since
nobody was being excluded from a trade or business; the interests of the challengers were
somewhat confused between the current impact of having a nuclear power plant in their
backyard and the future possibility of catastrophic losses. In the more typical case of a
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LaFleur is an almost natural outgrowth of the protection provided by
procedural due process for public employment. One of the requisites of
due process, whether labeled procedural or substantive, is that the
decision-maker must make a rational decision on the basis of available
evidence.'76 If this rule were applied to legislative judgments, then we
would have substantive due process with respect to public employment.
Actually, the same analysis was applied to public regulation of the
professions through Gibson," although the Court denied it in North
Dakota Pharmacy." The Court need only recognize that the case for
due process invalidation in Gibson was made on the substantive rules,
rather than the procedural defect and that the case simply was not made
adequately in North Dakota Pharmacy. The North Dakota case came out
as it did not because of a lack of any substantive due process review, but
because there was substantive review and the Court was not persuaded to
abandon the deferential review standard for legislative judgments on
economic and professional issues.79 Further, the impact on the right of
livelihood simply was not sufficiently demonstrated.
5. Concluding Thoughts on Procedural
Definitions of Property
The "procedural" due process cases make several significant points.
First, no bright line exists between procedural and substantive aspects of
state treatment of the claims that the Supreme Court will review for
fairness and rationality. Second, the link between definition of the claim
and due process protection is becoming more firmly established,
solidifying the presence of 'a judicial review over substantive state law
decisions.' Finally, there is a need for recognition of some core
intangible property rights protected by federal law regardless of how the
state defines the claim of right.
procedural framework that operates to exclude people from a profession, there may be
more room for the Gibson rationale to expand across procedural and substantive due
process.
1
'
7 See Lucius P. MCGEHEE, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 40-41 (1906).
7 Gibson, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973).
'n North Dakota Pharmacy, 414 U.S. 156, 163 (1973).
See id. at 164-65.
A different sort of substantive due process approach is suggested in Michael Wells
& Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts 18
GA. L. REV. 201, 235-36 (1984). They suggest that the question to be decided in these
cases is whether the defendant's conduct has passed the boundary of acceptable
governmental behavior toward individuals.
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The right of livelihood is one right that is protectable, not because the
state defines the claim, but because the Constitution protects it regardless
of how the state defines it. While the state may be able to justify a
sharply limited form of an entitlement, such as "employment at will" in
a public agency, such a justification should be made on substantive
grounds, meaning that the court would need to be persuaded that the
substantive values put forth by the state outweigh the substantive values
of the right of livelihood.
B. Responses to AntiCompetitive Regulations Under Other Doctrines
In the absence of substantive due process, imaginative litigators have
attacked anticompetitive systems on other grounds. A number of these
have been successful, but the doctrinal fabric is far from complete. One
doctrinal theme that could bring together what seems to be a number of
disparate holdings is a return to the disfavoring of unregulated monopo-
lies. The unregulated monopoly threatens entry to markets, thus threaten-
ing what Lord Coke believed to be a fundamental liberty of the citi-
zen."8' As an element of substantive due process, the right of access to
a vocation might make a great deal of sense in today's world.
1. Equal Protection
The Court's approach to state economic regulation challenges under
the Equal Protection Clause parallels the Court's deferential approach
under the Due Process Clause.' Nevertheless, the Court has begun to
breathe some life into the Equal Protection Clause, at least in the area of
interstate business.
When the state of Alabama taxed out-of-state insurance companies at
a higher rate than domestic companies, the Court held that the practice
was a violation of equal protection.' The state's purpose of promoting
'See generally Sa WIA.AM HOLDSWORTH, SOME MAKERS OF ENGLUH LAw 111-
32 (1938) (discussing Lord Coke's views and contributions to English law).
' In New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976), the Court said.
[The judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge the wisdom or
desirability of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect
findeamental rights nor proceed along suspect lines.. . ; in the local economic
sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which
cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 303-04 (citations omitted) (upholding an ordinance outlawing street vendors but
"grandfatheringY' two vendors who had been in operation for more than eight years).
" Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 883 (1985). The companies
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investment in domestic facilities was held to be impermissible.'
Although the state's desire to promote the formation of new domestic
companies was permissible, this desire could not be accomplished by
discriminating against foreign companies." The dissenters claimed that
both purposes should be permissible and that the Court should defer to
the legislative policy judgment'
An extension of the approach of the insurance company tax case from
interstate commerce to economic regulations that distinguished among
persons and companies within the state might serve as a vehicle for
review of anticompetitive regulations. The Court would then need to ask
whether there was a rational basis for excluding someone from, while
allowing others to enter, a trade or business practice. Subjecting the
legislative and administrative judgments of public safety and protection
to judicial review would result in the question of how stringent the
rational basis test allows that review to be. As explained below,'"
rational basis is a problematic phrase for a judicial analysis, but the
analysis that it could identify would be apt when properly described and
applied.
Many commentators have noted that the modem three-tiered equal
protection analysis is a thinly disguised substitute for substantive due
process." The analysis of reasonableness, however, usually takes place
in the context of groups of people who can be logically separated
according to some legislative classification. When the legislation touches
an interest entitled to special constitutional protection, the Court has
cautiously applied the same analysis regardless of whether the legislation
actually divides people into differently treated groups.
The clearest example of such an analysis to date is Clark v. Jeter,'"
which dealt with a six-year statute of limitations for paternity actions. The
Court employed the "heightened, intermediate" scrutiny rather than the
compelling interest or rational basis test because the state action impacted
could not challenge the tax as an imposition on commerce because Congress had ceded
all control over insurance to the states in the McCanan-Ferguson Act and because, as
corporations, they were not citizens of any state for purposes of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.
1t Id at 876-80.
Id. at 879.
11 Id. at 883 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
1
'
7 See infra notes 189-95 and accompanying text.
See generally Cynthia A. Vroom, Equal Protection vs. The Principle of Equality,
21 CAP. U. L. REV. 199, 210-15 (1992).
"' 486 U.S. 456, 461-63 (1988).
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on a classification based on illegitimacy.'" The problem was that the
legitimate or illegitimate classification was not for purposes of the statute
of limitations; the state had not given legitimate children more time in
which to file paternity actions. What the state had done was to classify
according to whether the mother was married at the time of birth9' and
to decree that children of unmarried mothers would not be owed legal
duties, such as support, from their fathers until the fact of fatherhood was
proved in a judicial proceeding." The groups of legitimate and illegiti-
mate children were not treated differently according to a statute of
limitations; no statute was appropriate for the legitimate group. Therefore,
the Court applied a straightforward reasonableness test to the statute
without concern for whether the legislature had a rational basis for the
classification.9 ' The outcome of the reasonableness test was nega-
tive," and the statute was held to be a violation of equal protection.
There can hardly be a more clear example of substantive due process
masquerading under another name.'
90 Id. at 461. Other cases on illegitimacy might have come to a similar conclusion
had the Court continued the analysis begun in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71-72
(1968). Lety invalidated a state statute preventing an illegitimate child from sharing in
a wrongful death recovery. The Court later extended the same holding to state wokers'
compensation recoveries in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 174-76
(1972). However, when it came to the question of inheriting from an intestate father, the
Court held that the father's choice, rather than state law, was the determinative factor.
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 555-57 (1971) (involving an illegitimate daughter who
claimed an interest in the estate of the decedent, whom she claimed was her father.
Louisiana's intestate succession laws denied an illegitimate child the ability to inherit if
the father had not acknowledged him as his child). If the Court had viewed Labine as
involving an irrebuttable presumption of the father's choice not to bequeath, then the case
might have run afoul of due process guarantees. As an equal protection case, however,
the Court need not impose strict scrutiny. In any event, these cases all involve aspects of
personal liberty usually identified as fitting within the special family relationship.
' Other tests of legitimacy, of course, can be used. For example, the state may use
the father's attestation on a birth certificate or other evidence of acknowledgment instead
of, or in addition to, marriage.
" Clark, 486 U.S. at 462.
m Id. at 463.
'9 The Court in Clark stated.
Even six years does not necessarily provide a reasonable opportunity to assert
a claim on behalf of an illegitimate child. . . . We are, however, confident that
the 6-year statute of limitations is not substantially related to Pennsylvania's
interest in avoiding the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.
Id. (alterations in original).
'" Two other "equal protection" cases from the 1987 Term could be described as
substantive due process cases, although each involved, to a degree, a classification related
[Vol. 82
RIGHT OF LIVELIHOOD
2. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause, unaided by congressional legislation, operates
to prevent a state from enacting regulations that are "discriminatory" or
"unduly burdensome" to interstate commerce." In recent years, the
Supreme Court has indicated that to examine state rules more closely for
"undue burdens" on commerce than for "irrational" impacts under the
Due Process Clause would be inconsistent.'97 Nevertheless, on a case-
by-case basis, the Court will find that a particular regulation unduly
burdens a particular business. 9
Regulations that burden interstate commerce certainly impact on
constitutional values, but whether the judiciary is the appropriate branch
for defining and implementing these particular values is questionable.
Congress was given authority to regulate commerce among the states for
the explicit purpose of preventing "balkanization' of trade.' One of
the two principal objectives of the Constitutional Convention was to find
a method for ending or preventing trade restrictions among the states."e
This objective has been redefined in this century to be an objective of
amalgamating the United States into one open market, a stronger version
to the challenged substantive provision. Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360
(1988) (challenging the exclusion of stiking labor union members from the food stamp
program); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450 (1988) (challenging the
imposition of user fees for school bus transportation in some, but not all, school districts
within the state).
' Martin H. Redish & Shane U. Nugent, The Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Cons itutional Balance of Federalism, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 598 ("Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court invalidates state regulations when they either
discriminate against out-of-state residents or when they unduly burden interstate
commerce...
"Id.
See generally Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333,
350 (1977) (holding that North Carolina labeling regulations unduly burdened the sale of
Washington apples, which had to meet a higher standard); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397
U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (holding that packaging regulations were unfair to a producer whose
packing plant was located across the state line).
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979).
The words of the Commerce Clause-"the Congress shall have power ... to ,
regulate Commerce ... among the several states. .. "--reflected a central
concern of the Framers that was an immediate reason for calling the Constitu-
tional Convention: the conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would
have to avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization ...
Id.
20 THE FEDERAuST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). The other objective was to create
a taxing power on the part of the federal government.
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of the same objectives that have motivated the European Economic Commu-
nity.
The Supreme Court has fallen into a logical bind because of nineteenth
century constructs involving the exclusivity of the categories of commerce.
In determining the limits on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause,
the Court held that some commerce was interstate and subject to federal
power while other commerce was intrastate and subject solely to state
control 01 The exclusive nature of the categories meant that the grant of
power to Congress excluded any state power to regulate in the field of
interstate commerce.2m When the Court realized that the categories were
not watertight and the category of interstate commerce expanded almost
without restraint, the Court could hardly exclude the states from regulating
any economic activity. Rather than choosing the corollary that the category
of intrastate commerce similarly lacked judicially enforceable constitutional
limits and was subject to restraint only by Congress,2 3 the Court continued
to assess the desirability of state regulation against updated versions of the
nineteenth century limits,204 resulting in the "undue burdens" test2 s
The result of the application of the "undue burdens" test is a line of cases
utterly inconsistent with each other" and often protecting commerce at an
2" See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Phila, 53 U.S. 299, 306 (1851)
(requiring that the Court determine whether a subject was of a nature requiring uniform
national regulation or diverse local regulation). The Court had earlier talked about
exclausive spheres in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 60-64, 74-75 (1824)
(opining that the power to regulate commerce is exclusive with respect to the objects of
the power), but changed its mind in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (holding that measures calculated for the benefit of the state, if not
conflicting with the powers of the federal government, are reserved to the states).
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318 ("If the Constitution excluded the states from making any
law regulating commerce, certainly Congress cannot regrant, or in any manner reconvey
to the States that power.").
' Two different approaches with similar results have been advocated. One isto assert
that divisions of power between state and federal government present nonjusticiable
issues. JESSE H. CHOPER, JuDIcIAL REVIEw AND THE NATIONAL POLmCAL PROCESs 175
(1980). The other approach is to adjudicate the question and hold that the Commerce
Clause itself sets no limits on the power of the several states to regulate interstate
commerce, but that Congress can limit the states' ability to regulate the same subject.
Redish & Nugent, supra note 196, at 573.
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 314 (examining the necessity of conforming regulation of
pilotage to the local peculiarities of each part of the country in contst to the possibility
of uniformity throughout the United States). Those limits were set by an assessment of
the need for national uniformity versus the need for local control.
' See Daniel A. Farber, State Regulation and the Dormnt Commerce Clause, 3
CONST. COMM. 395 (1986) (discussing the "undue burdens" test).
206 Compare Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Conm'n,432 U.S. 333, 350
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almost palpable risk to public safety.2 7 Although the Court purports to
apply "federalism" principles, which limit the degree to which one state
can interfere with the processes of others, the Court has, in reality,
created a set of economic rights protecting the enterprise of business
itself Were this set of economic rights to survive at all, it might be better
framed under the heading of "due process," thereby recognizing the
special concerns of federalism and interstate commerce. The test itself;
using the term "undue," reflects a conscious, substantive review of the
wisdom of particular regulations.
The "undue burden!' cases illustrate many of the same problems that
were encountered by the old substantive due process doctrine. In two
cases involving the permissible length and configuration of trucks, the
Court has overruled legislative judgments of safety necessities.2
Because the state was unable to come forward with evidence showing that
larger trucks were unsafe, the Court held that the safety concern did not
justify the burden on commerce. Of course, the state would not be
able to provide that evidence until the larger trucks were allowed onto the
highways to kill people. To. one who must now fight triple behemoths
loaded with flammable products on the highways, the Court's solicitude
for some business interests10 seems particularly reprehensible.
(1977) (holding that the Commerce Clause, in effect protected display of Washington
State apple grades on closed containers shipped into other states) with Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (holding that an Arizona statute requiring all
Arizona-grown cantaloupes to be packaged in Arizona was an unlawful burden on
interstate commerce). Compare City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978)
(holding that New Jersey could not ban all out-of-state waste based on its origin) with
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 473-74 (1981) (upholding a statute
that barred the retail sale of milk in rigid, plastic, nonreturnable containers).
2 See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678-79 (1981)
(striking down an Iowa law that generally prohibited use of sixty-five foot, double trailer
trucks within the state); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 447-48
(1978) (holding that Wisconsin regulations restricting the operation of trucks over fifty-
five feet long and of double-trailer trucks traveling upon interstate highways violate the
Commerce Clause).
2 Kassel, 450 U.S. 662, 678-79 (1981); Raymond Motor Tramp., Inc., 434 U.S. 429,
447-48 (1980).
20 Kassel, 450 U.S. at 671 ("Here ... the State failed to present any persuasive
evidence that sixty-five foot doubles are less safe than fifty-five foot singles.').210 It is interesting to speculate how the Court would have responded had the state
argued the truck limit as an economic regulation designed to encourage more investment
in trucks and to spread business among more trucking companies. Under the hands-off
approach, an economic rationale might have fared better.
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The vagaries of the undue burdens test are legion and even less capable
of rational explanation than the old substantive due process cases?"1 For
example, the Court repeatedly condemns economic protectionism and
fiustration of out-of-state competition, and yet has upheld some explicitly
protectionist regulations when the burdens on commerce did not strike the
Court as being undue? 3 In addition, when the state can be described as a
'"market participant," the Court grants almost a blanket exemption from the
restraints of the Commerce Clause? 4 The Court grants this exemption in
spite of the &ct that the effects of the statet practice are unchanged regardless
of whether tax money rather than regulation is the vehicle for accomplishing
the state' objectives. For example, no practical difference exists between
requiring a "private" company to supply products to state residents and
buying the company so that the state itself can distribute those same products
to state residents. Nor is it clear why a cardboard-producing state can exclude
plastic milk cartons"' but cannot exclude less desirable items after they
become garbage? 6 Nor is there any reason why the state should be
constrained from enacting a resident-preference rule for employers purchasing
state-owned resources" considering that it can enact the same rule when
the employer is carrying out a services contract with the state218 (although
the rule might be invalid under the Privileges and Immunities Clause).219
2" See generally Redish & Nugent, supra note 196 (analyzing the Court's justifica-
tions for striking down state regulations under the Dormant Commerce Clause).
2 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 874-75 (1985) (holding
unconstitutional a state statute imposing a substantially lower premiums tax on domestic
insurance companies than on out-of-state companies).
' E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 146 (1970) (balancing state and national
interests even when the state's motivation is strictly economic).
2 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 446-47 (1980) (holding that the Commerce
Clause did not prevent the state of South Dakota from discriminating in favor of its
residents with respect to sales from a state-owned cement factory); Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 814 (1976) (holding that the Commerce 'Clause did not
prevent the state of Maryland from imposing more stringent documentation requirements
on out-of-state scrap processors than on in-state processors).
2, Minnesota v. Clover Lea Creamery, 449 U.S. 456, 473-74 (1981).
2" City of Phila. v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1978).
2'7 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82,100-01 (1984) (holding
that an Alaskan requirement that timber taken from state lands be processed in Alaska
was subject to the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine).
21 White v. Ma s = Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 210 (1983)
(holding that the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine does not apply to an executive
order requiring that all city construction projects be performed by a work force at least
half of which reside in the city).
2 United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 210 (1984) (holding that
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A strong argument can be made that the entire field of interstate
commerce regulation is committed to Congress and that the Court has no
business making determinations of what constitutes an unreasonable
burden on commerce. This argument relies heavily on the difficulty
in finding judicially manageable standards- to apply and on the power of
Congress to make such determinations through a political process in
which the states have their own role. The Supreme Court has left the area
in a confusing state, but that does not mean that there are no discernible
standards. If the Court focused squarely on discrimination and balkani-
zation as the sole bases for invalidating a state regulation, then it could
apply articulable standards to the issues. These standards, however, would
have little to do with reasonableness or any other substantive due process
approach. This seems to be an area particularly unsuited for due process
reasoning, and the Court's tendency to use such reasoning has gotten it
into much trouble. This is an area to be left alone by our new economic
substantive due process.
3. Privileges and Immunities
Although the privileges and immunities of federal citizenship have
not expanded after their restrictive reading in the Slaughterhouse
Cases,"1 the privileges and immunities of state citizenship protected by
Article IV' have taken on increased significance in recent years. The
Court now uses this clause in Article IV as a guarantee of equal
protection on behalf of outsiders. In two cases involving very high
licensing fees for out-of-staters as compared to much lower fees for
residents, the Court invalidated a shrimp fishing fee and upheld an
elk hunting fee.' The Court saw the difference between the two fees
a city's imposition of a forty percent resident hiring requirement upon all contractors
working on city-funded public works construction projects must satisfy a Privileges and
Immunities Clause test).
0 Redish & Nugent supra note 196, at 569-72.
Slaughteahouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 WalL) 36, 82 (1873).
z"U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
'n Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 403 (1948) (holding that shrimp fishing license
fees that discriminated on the basis of residency violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause).
22 Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (upholding
a statute which prescribed fees for nonresidents' elk hunting licenses that were several
times higher than fees for residents).
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to be the degree of impact on a person's occupation and livelihood.'
In virtually identical cases of employment preference laws for local
residents, the Supreme Court upheld one against an attack under the
Commerce Clause 6 and held the other to be an affront to the privileg-
es and immunities of citizens of other states?2
Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Pipei2 illustrates the domi-
nant role of the right of livelihood as a protected interest. The Piper
Court designated the opportunity to practice law as a "fundamental
right"' - under national law and thus subject to the "substantial reason"
and "close relation!' level of review. As with most other claims given
this intermediate type of "means-ends" treatment, the right of a profession
prevailed over the state's purported interest of having knowledgeable and
locally involved attorneys. A scrutiny that forces the state to justify its
chosen method by showing that it is needed to accomplish an important
objective' is nothing other than the old rational basis test of the
Lochner period.' Surely, if the state excluded attorneys on some
irrational basis besides nonresidency, the Court would apply the same test
with the same result.
4. Contract Clause
The Framers almost certainly intended the Contract Clause 3 for
the narrow purpose of preventing state legislatures from passing
legislation forgiving debts.' While this was the clause's first
w2 Id. at 387-88.
22 White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204, 214 (1983).
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221-23 (1984).
2n 470 U.S. 274, 288 (1985) (holding that a New Hampshire requirement that only
residents could be admitted to the state's bar violated the Privileges and Immunities
Clause).
mId at 281.
220 Id at 288.
231 Id. at 284.
232 ee supra notes 18-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Lochner period and
Locer doctrines).
m U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 (CNo [s]tate shall... pass any ... [l]aw impairing
the [o]bligation of [c]ontracts. :).
For example, Hamilton discussed the contract claum in the context of national
unity, indicating that citizens of various states ought to be able to contract in other states
without fear that legislative action will interfere with contractual rights. TH FDERAIST
No. 7. Madison included the contract clause in a general discussion stating that -the
contract clause, along with the ex post facto clause and the clause prohibiting bills of
attainder, prevented retroactive legislative interference with items of "personal security
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use, the Court in Fletcher v. Peck' relied on the Contract Clause
as a source of natural rights in state grants. Moreover, Dartmouth College
v. Wood 7 expanded the clause's reach to prevent the unilateral amend-
ment of state-granted corporate charters. The philosophy of the Contract
Clause was often invoked during the heyday of substantive due process
as a bolstering point for the liberty of contracL' When due process
suffered its demise, the Contract Clause also fell into desuetude 39 The
clause's brief revival more than a decade ago' has not been pursued,
and the clause today seems to stand only for the limited proposition that
only rarely can a state retroactively create new liabilities for actions that
were not unlawful when committed or, conversely, excuse debts that were
legitimate when created.e'
5. First Amendment
Protection of corporate and commercial expression could be viewed
as a mild rebirth of judicial protection for economic interests. In recent
years, the Court has struck down state regulatory attempts to force public
utilities either to exclude certain types of inserts from their billing
and private rights." THE FEDEDUST No. 44.
23 Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 127 (1819) (invalidating a New
York law discharging debtors of their obligations upon surrender of their property).
2m 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 139 (1810) (holding that a state legislature could not
constitutionally rescind land grants to individuals who had purchased the land in good
faith).
23 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (holding that an act of the state legislature of New
Hampshire to alter the Charter of Dartmouth College without the college's consent was
a violation of the contract clause).
u Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE L.J. 454, 457-58 (1909) (describing
the development and the Courts' treatment of the doctrine of "'liberty of contract").
Actually, the rhetoric of contrac began to fall away as the rhetoric of substantive due
process gained ascendancy. Note, The Contract Clause of the Federal Constitution, 32
COLUM. L. REV. 476, 478 (1932) ("However, the last fifty years have witnessed a decline
in the importance of the contract clause. The limelight has shifted to due process").
2"See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 447-48 (1934)
(upholding a state statute extending the redemption period following a mortgage
foreclosure sale).
v4 Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 350-51 (1978) (holding that a
Minnesota statute which subjected employers to a "pension funding charge" violated the
Contract Cla se).
24 See United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977) (strilg a New
Jersey statute that retroactively repealed a bond covenant limiting the power of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey to use bond proceeds to fund unprofitable mass
transit systems).
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envelope? 2  or to include rebuttals,2' and has protected corporate
advocacy in political campaigns.2 The Court has been particularly
active in using First Amendment values to protect advertising by
professionals such as lawyers 5 and pharmacists,2  thus reducing the
anticompetitive effect of state control over the licensed professions.
The rights of association and nonassociation are also extensions of
First Amendment interests. The right of association started simply as a
restriction on the state's ability to impede the gathering together of
persons to promote mutual political interests.2 - The right has expanded,
however, to include gatherings for purely social purposes, although the
Court has held that this branch must yield to competing state goals such
as equality " Meanwhile, a right of nonassociation has been urged
unsuccessfully in cases in which a property owner claimed protection
from state demands of access to the property for speech interests " and
workers claimed protection from state-enforced labor union dues.' The
' Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-35 (1980)
(holding that an order by the New York Public Service Commission prohibiting utility
companies from including inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy in
monthly bills directly infringes freedom of speech).
.' Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'nof Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1986)
(holding unconstitutional a state utility commission order requiring a private utility
company to provide space in its biling envelopes four times a year to a private interest
group critical of the utility).
2 First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (holding unconstitutional a
Massachusetts criminal statute that prohibited certain expenditures by banks and business
corporations for the purpose of influencing the vote on a referedum).
" Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (holding that a blanket ban
by the Arizona State Bar on lawyer price advertising in newspapers for routine legal
services violated freedom of speech).
' Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a Virginia statute that prohibited pharmacists
from advertising the price of prescription drugs).
4 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958) (holding that the state of Alabama
could not compel the NAACP to disclose its membership lists).
' Now York State Club Ass'n. v. City of N. Y., 487 U.S. 1, 18 (1988) (upholding
a New York City law prohibiting discrimination in clubs with more than 400 members
that provide benefits to businesses and non-members); Board of Directors of Rotary In'l
v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987) (upholding a California
antiscrimination statute that required the Rotary Club to admit females); Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628-29 (1984) (upholding an interpretation of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act applying the Act's bar of gender discrimination by public
business entities to the "males only" membership rules of the United States Jaycees).
4" Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980).
o Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235-37 (1977) (holding unconstitu-
tional compulsory service fees charged under a closed shop agreement that were used for
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latter holding is highly questionable today, as the cases on compulsory
bar membership demonstrate.
The lawyer's First Amendment claim to refuse participation in a
mandatory bar association shows the difference between First Amendment
and substantive due process claims. Under the First Amendment,' the
analysis focuses on verbal expression of political positions by the bar, and
the remedy is mere refund of that portion of the lawyer's bar dues
reflecting political activity by the bar association.' Under substantive
due process, however, the challenge would go to the very existence of
membership as a licensing requirement. In Keller v. State Bar of
California," the Supreme Court unanimously accepted a First Amend-
ment challenge to the spending of bar dues while assuming the validity
of compulsory membership.' The case raises at least as many ques-
tions as it answers, not the least of which is why the plaintifls failed to
attack the mandatory membership rule itself.
Keller was preceded by Lathrop v. Donohue," in which a plurality
of the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to mandatory bar
membership, while leaving open the claim that dues could not be exacted
for political advocacy. There being no majority opinion for the Court, the
votes were roughly divided as follows. Three Justices, represented by
Brennan, held that the State could require membership for the purpose of
"elevating the educational and ethical standards" of lawyers general-
ly. This group left open the question of whether a lawyer could
the ideological or political objectives of the Union); Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,
769-71 (1961) (holding that unions may not support against the protests of union members
political candidates or doctrines with union dues).
" U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right
of the people peaceably to assemble ... .).
' Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1990) (holding that the California
State Bar's use of compulsory dues to finance political and ideological activities with
which members disagree violates those members' First Amendment rights).
2 496 U.S. 1 (1990).
2m Id. at 4.
" 367 U.S. 820, 847-48 (1961) (holding that rules requiring lawyers practicing inthe
state of Wisconsin to become members of the integrated State Bar of Wisconsin and to
pay reasonable annual dues were constitutional).
Brennan's opinion stated:
Both in purport and in practice the bulk of State Bar activities serve the
function, or at least so Wisconsin might reasonably believe, of elevating the
educational and ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality
of legal service available to the people of the State, without any reference to the
political process. It cannot be denied that this is a legitimate end of state policy.
We think that the Sureme Court of Wisconsin, in order to further the State's
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"constitutionally be compelled to contribute his financial support to
political activities which he opposes." Three other Justices would
have cleared the mandatory membership requirement on both associa-
tional and free speech grounds.' Justice Douglas would have found a
violation of the right of association (or nonassociation),2 9 and Justice
Black would have found a violation of his absolute version of free
speech.2 Thus, six Justices found a sufficient justification for requiring
membership, but five were at least willing to consider the argument that
dues could not be exacted for political purposes.
One case that challenged both premises of Lathrop, Levine v.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, died on its way to the Supreme Court.
The district court in Levine held that compulsory bar membership is a
violation of the right of nonassociation.2 2 The two key elements for the
district court's consideration were that the Supreme Court apparently had
altered its views since Lathrop and that the Wisconsin disciplinary system
had changed. The change in law to which the district court referred was
the increasing significance attached to associational and nonassociational
interests.2 Even more important, however, were the changes in
Wisconsin's practice that had created separate agencies for continuing
legal education and for lawyer disciplinary process.2! " Without serving
these functions, the Wisconsin bar lacked any justification for the
compulsory membership that had existed at the time of Lathrop. 5
legitimate interests in raising the quality of professional services, may
constitutionally require that the costs of improving the profession in this fashion
should be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program,
the lawyers, even though the organization created to attain the objective also
engages in some legislative activity.
Id. at 843.
2 Id. at 848.
Id. (Harlan, J.; Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 865 (Whittaker, J., concurring).
Id. at 881 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20 Id. at 873 (Black, J., dissenting).
= 679 F. Supp. 1478, 1502 (W.D. Wis. 1988) (holding that the requirement that
attorneys belong to the State Bar of Wisconsin as a condition of practicing law in
Wisconsin abridges the attorney's rights of fice speech and free association under the First
Amendment).
= Id.
SId.
u Lathrop, 367 U.S. at 828-30.
2 Levine was reversed in Levine v. Heffennan, 864 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1989), in
which the Seventh Circuit stated that "the district court overemphasized the importance
of the bar's role in the areas of continuing legal education and attorney discipline to the
Lathrop Court. This overemphasis in turn, led the district Court to erroneously conclude
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Meanwhile, during the same period, a number of other courts had dealt
with challenges to integrated bars!" Two trends seemed to be emerging.
First retention by the state bar of the disciplinary athority was a key factor
in whether membership could be required. Second, exemption from a
portion of the dues representing political activity could be ordered as part of
the free speech claim.
It is a mystery why retention of the disciplinary authority is a factor in
favor of mandatory membership. If an otherwise ,private" entity takes on the
function of licensing and license revocation on behalf of the state, then it is
unquestionably a state entity. Nothing would be terribly offensive about the
state telling practitioners of a certain trade that they must pay an annual fee
for the costs of maintaining the disciplinary system for that trade. It is
offensive, however, to tell those practitioners that the agency will use their
fees for "educational" and other policy-making fimctions that are not
controlled by the state when the price of nonpayment is the loss of one'
license!' Moreover, the bar association is surely setting the standards of
conduct in the course of disciplinary proceedings, even if the basic 'law" of
ethical practice is handed down by some other entity (the court or legisla-
ture). Delegating the setting of professional conduct standards to an
unregulated political structure is the essence of the unregulated monopoly that
British law had declared to be offensive to basic liberty?7
0
The Keller plaintif had the opportunity to break new ground by testing
the Wisconsin District Courts assertion that the Supreme Court had altered
that Lathrop was not a controlling precedent in this case' Id. at 462.
' Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569-70 (lth Cir. 1986) (holding that
certain positions taken by the State Bar of Florida were not sufficiently germane to its
administration-of-justice function to justif' the expenditure of compulsory dues); Keller
v. State Bar Ass'n, 181 Cal. App: 3d 471, 226 Cal. Rptr. 448, 452 (1986) (holding that
members of the State Bar may not constitutionally be compelled to support political and
ideological positions with which they disagree); Falk v. State Bar of Mich., 305 N.W.2d
201, 246-47 (Mich. 1981), subsequent opinion, 342 N.W.2d 504, 511-14 (Mich. 1983)
(holding that the State Bar of Michigan may constitutionally use mandatory dues of
members for lobbying and other activities of the State Bar); In re RI. Bar Ass'n, 374
A.2d 802, 804 (RiL 1977) (upholding a motion by the Rhode Island Bar Association
suspending an attorney for not paying his dues).
u In re RI. Bar Ass'n, 374 A.2d at 803.
See In re RI. Bar Ass'n, 374 A.2d at 804.
2 1he position of the disciplinary board members here is not very different from the
position of the board members in Gibson in that both Boards determined the position that
the Bar would adopt on various issues. See Gibson v. Florida Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1565-
66 (lth Cir. 1986).
27 Case of Monopolies, Darcy v. Allen, 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (1602) (invalidating royal
grant of exclusive license to produce playing cards).
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its position since Lathrop. Instead, the plaintiffs chose to attack only
those portions of the bar expenditures that were not "germane" to the
purposes of the association.2 ' The Court accepted this attack, thereby
creating the question of to what the test of germanity refers.2 Can the
bar require dues to be paid only for the purposes- of "regulating the legal
profession and improving the quality of legal services,"2 as the Court
implies at one point in its opinion?27' If so, there will be never-ending
disputes over whether a particular staff member's time is spent on
"improving the quality of legal services." '27
Even with the opt-out for politically offensive activities, mandatory
bar membership restricts the lawyer's right of livelihood without
providing a concomitant public benefit. One asserted public benefit is the
setting of ethical standards by knowledgeable practitioners 6  Even
without questioning whether the setting of ethical standards by those
involved in a type of practice that may be completely different than the
type of practice in which other lawyers are engaged is proper, it is highly
suspect to allow a self-governing institution to police its own ethical
standards. A less restrictive alternative would be for the state to police the
ethical behavior of its lawyers directly rather than using the self-serving,
anticompetitive mechanism of other lawyers.
A second asserted public benefit of mandatory bar membership is the
education of lawyers.2' Again, a requirement of continuing legal
n Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 13 (1990).
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14 (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).
1 The Court at least made it clear that the Bar's asserted test of'Improvement of the
administration of justice" was too broad. Id. at 15.
2'
7 Id. Allowing a rebate of the portion of the fee going to nongennane political
activities is not particularly helpful. In the first place, calculation of that amount is fraught
with uncertainty. The entire staff of the bar association exists for political purposes to one
extent or another. Every phone ca every media interview, every committee meeting has
some role in developing the political positions of the bar or selling a certain image to the
public. In the second place, rebating a portion of the fee does not alleviate the part of the
objection that goes to the setting of licensing standards by a self-interested portion of the
profession itself. That part of the double bind cannot be eliminated without taking away
the disciplinary function. If that function were eliminated, then mandatory membership
would not be nearly so offensive.
2' Id. at 13 ("The State Bar of California was created ... to provide specialized
professional advice to those with the ultimate responsibility of governing the legal
profession.").
'n "Precisely where the line falls between ... activities in which... the Bar [is]
acting essentially ... and those activities having political ideological [implications] ...
not reasonably related to the advancement of [essential activities] ... will not always be
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education, even if it has a sufficient benefit to warrant its imposition, can
be supplied by a number of providers without a requirement of member-
ship in a trade association. In the face of these questionable public
benefits is the infringement on the lawyer's right of livelihood by being
required to support a self-serving organization with which he disagrees.
The justification for allowing a compulsory fee to support bar-related
political activities is a rule of necessity- removal of the compulsory fee
would be akin to creating free riders by allowing some people to benefit
from the bar's activities without paying for them.27 Based on this
rationale, one federal court upheld the federal government's imposition of
a mandatory fee on beef producers, the proceeds of which were to be
used for promoting the beef industry.279 This rationale supports at most
only the imposition of fees for activities that benefit each member of the
bar, and the disciplinary function is probably the only function that can
meet this test. Even then, the establishment-like aspect of being required
to support an entity against your wishes is highly questionable.
Including the right to practice a profession is not a great extension
within the definition of expression. The right to be a river pilot free of
nepotism or a lawyer with off-beat values could easily be a part of one's
ability to express oneself in the modem world. If so, then the First
Amendment could become part of the emanations creating protection for
some aspects of the right of professional livelihood. But the First
Amendment by itself does not carry the explicit history of protection
against unregulated monopolies that is contained within due process, and
First Amendment analysis does not extend to the requirement of
compulsory membership.
6. Antitrust
Federal antitrust lawse prohibit monopolization and agreements in
restraint of trade, such as agreements to set prices. When a state
legislature or agency grants a monopoly or sets prices, the arrangement
easy to discern." Id. at 15.
271 The Keller Court stated.
If every citizen were to have a right to insist that no one paid by public
funds express a view with which he disagreed, debate over issues of great
concern to the public would be limited to those in the private sector, and the
process of government as we know it radically transformed.
Id. at 12-13.
United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119, 1143 (3d Cir. 1989).
,0 Shennman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
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could have been challenged as a violation of federal law had the Supreme
Court not created an implied exception for state action in Parker
v. Brown.' The issue in Brown was the California Agricultural Prorat-
edAdvisory Commission's authorization of farm cooperatives to establish
pricing policies for various crops grown exclusively within the state and
consumed almost entirely outside California. When competing
producers challenged the scheme, the Court responded that the antitrust
laws are directed against "individual and not state action." 3
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bail" was a challenge to state bar
association enforcement of a minimum fee schedule for certain kinds of
services.2  The Supreme Court found that the fee schedule had neither
been adopted nor required by the state licensing authority, which was the
state supreme court.' "It is not enough that ... anticompetitive
conduct is 'prompted' by state action; rather, anticompetitive activities
must be compelled by direction of the State acting as a sovereign [to fall
within the State action exception to the Sherman Act].' ' Bates v. State
Bar of Arizonad was a similar challenge to state bar rules against
lawyer advertising that began with a state disciplinary proceeding and
eventually ended in the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
held that Arizona's rules "reflect[ed] a clear articulation of the State's
policy ... [and were] subject to pointed reexamination by the policy-
maker-the Arizona Supreme Court-in enforcement proceedings."
Therefore, the rules were exempt from operation of the federal antitrust
laws' The Court went on, however, to hold that a blanket prohibition
on all lawyer advertising would violate the First Amendment guarantees
of free speech and press and that the rules in question were unconstitu-
tional 291
In a series of cases typified by Southern Motor Carriers Rate
Conference v. United States, 2 the Court held that the state need not
compel the anticompetitive conduct but that mere authorization and
22 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
mid
2
n Id. at 352.
2" Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
22s Id.
2" Id. at 790.
2" Id. at 791.
2" Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
29 Id. at 362.
m Id. at 363.
29
' Id. at 384.
2'2 471 U.S. 48 (1985).
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"active supervision' are enough to invoke the state-action exception. 9
Thus, the Court is forcing professions that want anticompetitive regula-
tibns to have those regulations explicitly authorized or supervised by state
agencies. When this happens, however, the practice then becomes state
action subject to constitutional challenge under the First Amendment, the
Equal Protection Clause,W ' the Contract Clause, 5 the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, or the Commerce Clause, not to mention the
Due Process Clause.29
7. Summary and Evaluation of Other Doctrines
In the absence of substantive due process, the Court has built an
impressive array of weapons for dealing with anticompetitive and
protectionist behavior by a state government at the behest of special
interest groups within the state. Two of these doctrines, derived from the
Commerce Clause and the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause,
deal explicitly with trans-state problems, and, thus far, the Equal
Protection Clause has been used in the economic field only against
nonresident discrimination. The Court, however, has noted the great
societal importance attached to interstate commerce and has drawn a
distinction between regulations that touch on a person's livelihood as
opposed to those that affect only recreational opportunities. The result is
the recognition of a protected right of profession or livelihood, at least in
areas that affect interstate business.
Is the ability to pursue a trade or profession deserving of protection
without regard to the interstate impact, that is, a protectable right of
livelihood within the state itself? The rhetoric of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment Privileges and Immunities Clause certainly lends itself to this
modem equivalence," particularly when bolstered by some of the older
rhetoric of the Contract Clause. If we add the protections now being
granted under the First Amendment and procedural due process, we have
See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984) (rejecting an antitrust challenge to the
state bar examination).
2M U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 1.
2 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cL 3.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
' The right so recognized would then be described as one of the 'fundamental rights
which belong to the citizens of all free governments." Daniel A. Farber, Legal
Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1352 (1988) (quoting Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961)).
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a panoply of claims that are not unlike the protections whose interstices
gave rise to the right of privacy in Gfiswold3  From the implications
of all of these clauses, we could find that there is a core right, much like
the right of privacy, that all of these peripheral clauses are designed to
enclose. That right would be the fundamental right of pursuing a trade or
occupation.
Is it necessary to recognize a fundamental right to pursue a trade or
profession in light of all the protections that are now evolving? The
principal advantage would be that the single core right would pull
together the divergent themes from the panoply that has been brought into
existence. It would serve as a unifying theme among, for example, the
First Amendment and privileges and immunities cases. In this portion of
their operation, the various provisions would then have a common set of
goals and analytic tools.
There is another approach that could reach a similar end. If Congress
enacted a provision repealing the state-action exception to the federal
antitrust laws, then the courts would have a statutory tool with which to
deal with anticompetitive behavior by the states. A new exception,
however, would be needed for those regulations reasonably designed to
protect public health and safety. As the law now stands, an industry can
obtain an exemption from federal antitrust requirements by having an
anticompetitive policy adopted by a state legislature or board. If the
legislature or board found a public need for the regulation and that
finding was supported by sufficient evidence, then the impact on the right
to work could be justified. Under this formulation, the antitrust laws
would function much as they do now, except for the layer of judicial
review at the stage of determining whether public justification for the
restriction existed. This formulation would also function very much like
substantive due process analysis. It might be preferable for the resurrec-
tion of substantive due process to come from Congress since Congress
could change either its own or the Court's mind if things get out of hand.
Nonetheless, if Congress fails to act, the Supreme Court has already put
into place all the elements of a judicial reincarnation of the doctrine. All
that remains is for the Court to utter the words and make clear the
operation of the doctrine.
The interplay of the antitrust laws with the new substantive due
process will work something like the following. If there is state action in
the rigorous sense of the antitrust laws, then substantive due process
supplies the constraints because there is an antitrust exemption. The
3. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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courts will ask the same questions of the state as it would have asked of
an unregulated scheme. The answers, however, may be very different
because the state is entitled to make a judgment, clothed with some
degree of deference, regarding the public benefits to be derived from the
anticompetitive scheme. This type of analysis works in the area of
exclusion from market entry, which is most commonly approached in the
name of the right of livelihood. Whether it has application in a more
general right of competition remains to be seen.
III. THE AREAS OF PROTECTED INTEREST AND JuDICIAL REVIEW
At this point, we switch from what the Court has done to what it
might do in the future. If economic rights, such as a right of livelihood,
were recognized as elements of substantive due process, what would be
the scope of the rights and what would be the standards for judicial
review over claimed violations of the rights?
A. Scope of the Rights-Protected Areas of Economic Life
First, we need to identify some elements of economic interests that
are deserving of substantive protection in today's world. The intent here
is not to construct rigid categories that some later generation will feel
compelled to dismantle or "deconstruct." The intent, instead, is simply to
identify elements that, at this stage in our history, will trigger special
solicitude under the Due Process Clause. Future problems will need future
solutions that may be different.
Property constructs serve several important social functions, identified
well by Professor Cohen's categories-economic productivity, =
occupation,"' labor' and personality 5  The same functions can
be said to lie behind more generalized protection for economic inter-
ests,' but the rigor of protection is not set simply by identifying the
30
' Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
The economic function seeks to promote maximum productivity. Id. at 19.
The occupation function refers to the law's role in protecting peaceful enjoyment
of an occupant's rights on the land. Id at 15.
The labor function refers to the protection of the fiuits of one's labors. Id at 16.
s Property rights encourage the development of personality traits, or what Madison
and Field called a person's facuties. Id at 18.
'This approach has been advocated by such diverse scholars as Epstein and
Sunstem. Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Legal Tradition, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 292,
297-99 (1988); Sunstein, supra note 2, at 884-86.
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functions to be performed. For example, criticisms of licensing and
regulatory processes on the ground that they impede economic interests
may fall short because the activities being regulated intersect more than
one person's protectable interests. The activity, such as practicing law,
does not merely serve the economic interests of the practitioner; it also
affects the personal development, productivity, and perhaps the labor of
the recipient of the activity. The practice of law also affects third parties
who are not parties to the transaction at all, and thus would have no
ability to protect their own interests. Government regulates these activities
precisely because they do affect persons other than the regulated. 7
Licensing and regulation, however, restrict activities that perform
many of the social functions formerly served by property. In the post-
industrial state, economic productivity, labor, and personality functions
merge in many aspects of our business lives. For example, restrictions on
market entry and participation cut across these three functions of the
property model.' When a particular regulation cannot be said to serve
the third-party recipient, then there may well be a substantive due process
objection, and we will need to see how the objection might be framed in
the marginal case.
1. The Right of Livelihood
Given the modem importance of work and the corollaries between
one's choice of livelihood and historic protections against unregulated
monopolies, it is appropriate to recognize a substantive "right of
livelihood." The label "right of livelihood" is chosen instead of "right of
occupation" in order to avoid confusion with the occupation function of
property. The "right to work' is also rejected in order to avoid
confusion with the anti-union movement and section fourteen of the Taft-
Hartley Act.3 e The "right of profession" might be preferable were it not
for the implication of identity with a narrow category of self-proclaimed
"learned" professions, and "vocation" seems too narrowly confined to
307 See Cohen, sipra note 301, at 26 (noting the positive duties that property owners
owe to third parties).
3m Business regulations outside the land-use field rarely implicate the occupation
function of property interests; nobody is likely to be seriously confused about who is
entitled to occupy an economic field that physically could accommodate an infinite
number of competitors. The natural monopoly will be regulated precisely because of the
exclusive occupancy.
.(. Wonn, ,upra note 8, at 92 (discussing the term "occGpation").
310 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 3101(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1988).
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certain types of jobs.31" ' A better label should be available but has not
yet suggested itself to this author.
In a sympathetic but critical treatment of the Lochner holdings,
written while that case still held sway, Professor Hamilton traced rights
of property from Locke's defense, premised in large part on the need to
protect the fiuits of a person's labor, through the period of abolitionist
rhetoric, to the industrialists. The latter pictured labor as a highly
individualized component of one'sproperty, thus fostering the divide-and-
conquer strategy that prevented the growth of labor unions and social
legislation. Marxist doctrine was only one of the responses to the
alienation of the person from the fiuits of his labor. Another response was
the effort to create equality of bargaining position so that laborers could
exact a fair return for their labor.3 14 The individualistic approach to
property interests and liberty of contrac 15 during the heyday of the
Lochner era, though it sounds almost sadistic to the modem ear, rang true
to many people at the time.1
When the Great Depression showed that individualizing or dividing-
and-conquering actually resulted in a loss of productivity,317 the social
functions of labor became clear. If a worker does not receive a fair return
on his or her labor, the workplace is likely to deny to the worker the
ability to be economically productive. One result of this denial is a
denigration of the individual's personality because of the very insistence
on "exalting" each individual as an isolated economic entity.3' A
311 Cf TRME, supra note 2, § 15-13, at 1373 (discussing the economic right of
vocation under the United States Constitution).
32 Walton H. Hamilton, Property-According to Locke, 41 YALE L.. 864 (1932).
31 3 For a brief introduction to Marxist doctrine, see generally GEmD HARDACK Fir AL.,
A SHORT HISTORY OF SOCIALIST ECONOMIC THOUGHT (James Wickham trans., 1978).
31 4 Robert L. H-ale, Labor Legislation as an Enlargement oflndivideal Liberty, 15 AM.
LABOR LEGI s. REv. 155 (1925); Thomas R. Powell, The Supreme Court's Control Over
the Issuance of Injctions in Labor Disputes, 13 PROC. ACAD. POL. SI. 37 (1928).
311 According to Locher, "[u]nder such circumstances [lack of ahealth rationale], the
freedom of master and employ6 to contract with each other in relation to their
employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or interfered with, without
violating the federal Constitution." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
31, Id. at 53 (discussing the right of contract as part of the liberties provided by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
37 Hamilton, supra note 312, at 878-80 & n.45.
313 Hamilton sap ta
[a]gainst an unplanned and undiected industrialism, and its imminent hazards
to life, liberty, and property, we have no constitutional rights. But thanks to
Jolm Locke-or to the thinkers, statesmen, warriors, business men, and jurists
who put the punch inhis words-we have adequate safeguards against the resort
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further consequence is a loss of total productivity, resulting in a loss of
profits to the entrepreneur.
Collectivization was necessary under these circumstances both to
prevent rin of the individual and to maintain acceptable levels of
productivity."9 But collectivization for economic power can have a
negative influence on the worker's initiative, and regulation in the public
interest can impede creativity and foreclose opportunities. If collectiviza-
tion and status stifle challenges to the existing order, then the public
interest itself can suffer. The interest mi pursuing a lawful trade or
occupation has been extolled by any number of writers, both on the
Supreme Court320 and elsewhere." In the post-industrial state, this
interest takes on even more significance. The high-tech world emphasizes
mental labor. Success in the modem economic world, whether viewed
individually or collectively, requires development of personality traits
because skills will be the most marketable commodities we will have.
Denying entry to a trade or profession is a direct deterrent to both
personal and economic potential In addition, regulations that restrict
entry into the profession may disserve the public interest by raising prices
and protecting the inept. Thus, the recognition of a right of livelihood is
warranted as much by the public interest and social objectives of an
economic (property) system as by individual concerns. Balanced against
these concerns is the need for protection of the public interest through
prevention of inept practice of a profession that is so complicated that the
marketplace cannot be expected to exert any sensible control on
competence. The consumer has no means to judge the ability or diligence
of a practitioner who may be seen only once in a lifetime, and demands
for heightened regulation or self-regulation of the professions increase
directly with the complexity of the profession.3'
by any state to the kind of stuff the Stuart kings used to pull.
Hamilton, sipra note 312, at 880.
" The result was the now-familiar theme of movement back from contract toward
status. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH op ComRAcr 58-59, 102 (1974); Roscoe Pound,
The New Feudal System, 19 Ky. L.1 1 (1930-31).
' The right to work, I had assumed, was the most precious liberty that man
possesses. Man has indeed as much right to work as he has to live, to be free,
to own roprty... .. To work means to eat It also means to live. For many it
would be better to work in jail, than to sit idle on the curb. The great values of
freedom are in the opportunities afforded man to press to new horizons, to pit
his strength against the forces of nature, to match skills with his fellow man.
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
' McCloskey, supra note 2, at 56-58.
3
,, See Gelihom, spra note 60, at 25. Actually, state codes reveal regulation of every
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The right of livelihood is not threatened by distributive schemes such
as taxation and wealth redistribution, the existence of which is implicit
in the social compact' 3 The right would only rarely be implicated by
land-use regulations,' which most often will be analyzed under the
Takings Clause.' Furthermore, most routine business regulatory
systems affecting banking, securities markets, or public utilities would not
seriously threaten the right of livelihood. The ordinary business regulatory
system may implicate the right of livelihood, but the public justifications
would be easy to demonstrate and justify.
2. A General Right of Competition
We could extrapolate from the right of livelihood to a right of
competition that would deal with many of the incidents of anticompetitive
state behavior described above since many of the same considerations are
involved. There could be unreasonable impositions on the ability to
pursue a trade when the state grants a monopoly to a public utility, such
as a cable television company, or allows an industry board to exclude
certain products from the market Exclusion of competition also works to
business from hair cutting through doctoring and lawyering. Nonetheless, the degree of
anxiety that the public feels about its inability to evaluate professional services certainly
increases asthe text indicates.
31 Epstein's statements in his TAKINGS book go too far in this regard. He seems to
have backed off and recognized that the mutual recicity of benefit implicit in taxation
and redistributive schemes is enough justification to avoid the effect of the Takings
Clause. RiCHARD A. EPSTIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMIENT DOMAIN (1985); Symposium on Richard Epstein's Takings: Private Propefly and
the Power of Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAI L. REV. 1, 11 (1986).
' But see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992) (holding
that South Carolina's coastal regulation, which deprived a landowner of all economic
benefit of his property, constituted a taking within the meaning of the Fiffh Amendment).
' This conclusion is more important than it might first appear. One of the reasons
for undertaking this Article was my initial belief that a workable version of substantive
due process might avoid some of the confusion that has arisen in the takings field. But
if substantive due process is limited to regulations that restrict the right of livelihood,
either by eliminating a trade or creating an unregulated monopoly, then the doctrine will
not have widespread utility with regard to land-use regulations. That leaves us flee to
approach issues under the compensation clause with less concern for whether the question
of public benefits ought to be addressed first under the Due Process Clause. In a takings
challenge, the public benefits of a regulation can be weighed directly against the effect
on core elements of the substantive, federal definition of property. The result is
compensation rather than invalidation, so the court is not skating on such thin ice in
making this direct comparison of benefits and costs.
1993-94]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the detriment of the public when it stifles innovation and raises pric-
es. ' 6 These practices can thus implicate economic productivity as well
as labor and personality functions. From the perspective of political
process theory, it is even possible to construct a constitutional argument
that judicial protection against anticompetitive seizure of legislative
processes is necessary to protect democratic institutions& 7
Indeed, the common law abhorrence of monopolies and the British
protection against unregulated monopolies was not only protection for the
aspiring competitor, but also protection for the public against the social
disutility and political subversion of the unregulated monopoly.' This
belief was so strong in pre-American law that it is quite possible to track
protection against unregulated monopolies into the liberties guarded by
the Due Process Clause.' In this context, the safeguards imposed on
the exercise of the patent and copyright powers of Congress are a
corollary of the rules against unregulated monopolies.Y
On the other hand, in an increasingly complicated technological
environment, very few of us can judge the safety or value of a product
or service. Some industries demand the presence of only one supplier
with heavy regulation and cross-market subsidization that require
continuous agency oversight rather than judicial intervention.3"
Recognizing a general right of competition would be a major step.
Arguably, though, it is not desirable in light of the protection already
afforded by other provisions of the Constitution. One could argue that
entry restrictions are being addressed in a reasonably satisfactory manner
by the current application of antitrust laws combined with the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment.
Arguments in favor of recognizing the right of competition include the
point that the panoply of constitutional doctrines being developed
obscures the focus that a single doctrine under due process might achieve.
In addition, federal antitrust law would need to be modified in order to
eliminate the state action exception before we could conclude that the
3m Wonnell, smpra note 8, at 97.
327 Id. at 108-11.
3,, Id. at 103-11.
329 Id at 111-29.
330 See John J. Flynn, The Orphan Drug Act: An Unconstitutional Exercise of the
Patent Power, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 389.
31 The breakup of AT&T's monopoly on long-distance services has been of
questionable benefit to consumers. For example, local telephone service rates have risen
because of the elimination of the subsidy from long-distance service. See generaly Louis
SCHWARTZ Er AL., GOVERNMENT REGUIATION 874, 881 (6th ed. 1985).
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panoply of protections would be sufficient for the time being.' The
economic productivity functions of property-liberty as well as some
elements of the personality and labor functions demand that we take the
presence of a general right of competition seriously.
For reasons of judicial process,333 the general right of competition
would be difficult to apply. Application of the right would throw the
courts into the business of directly addressing either the good faith or the
wisdom of the legislature in the absence of the clarity of individual
interests afforded in the right of livelihood. For now, it should be
sufficient to emphasize the right of livelihood and leave it to future
advocacy to disclose whether other categories of rights may be implied
from the functional justifications for property recognition.3"
3. Freedom from Regulation
There has floated in some circles the notion that government can do
only what private citizens could do prior to government. 35 Sometimes
this argument is phrased in "political science" terms as stemming from
the assumption that participants in the social compact can grant no more
authority to government than they held themselves." The argument
may also take the form of insisting that regulation subverts the limits on
government that were a precondition to the social compact in order to
prevent domination by interest groups. 7 A logical outcome of the
m See supra note 280 and accompanying text for more information concerning
federal antitrust law. For a discussion of the state action exception, see supra notes 281-
90 and accompanying text.
" See inffra notes 337-41 and accompanying text.
3 Avery different set of interests are disclosed in state regulatory schemes designed
to benefit local residents as opposed to out-of-state people. Such schemes implicate
federalism concerns but only occasionally intersect with any of the rationales for
recognition of property interests. The right of livelihood was involved in a number of
privileges and immunities cases, including the shrimp and elk cases. See Baldwin v.
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978) (holding that a state may
charge a nonresident more than a resident for an identical elk hunting license because elk
hunting was deemed recreation as opposed to a means of livelihood); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948) (ruling that a large disparity between license fees charged resident
and nonresident commercial shrimp fishermen was a violation of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
3 Epstein, supra note 306, at 12-13 (citing JoHN LOCKF, OF CIviL GOvERNmENT at
135 (1690)).
3m See id. at 12 (stating that "[n]o one can convey what he does not own").
3 See id. at 16-17; Note, Reswrecfing Economic Rights: The Doctrine of Economic
Due Process Reconsidered, 103 HAav. L. REv. 1363, 1372-73 (1990).
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argument is that regulation for any purpose other than self-protection is
invalid; government would not be able to regulate for the purpose of
increasing productivity or general social welfare.
This position is patently ridiculous. Government exists precisely for
the purpose of accomplishing collective goals. Those goals may well
include the functions of increasing productivity as well as protecting the
fruits of labor and personality. But if government seems to intrude upon
those functions for one group, it may well be enhancing those same
functions for another group. It is precisely this collective choice that has
given rise to the creation of government and the vesting of the police
power, which must be adequate for all purposes except invasions of
protected interests. To create a general right to be free of regulation
would not define a protected interest but would instead deny the very
existence of the governmental power itself.
The activities that might be protected by a general freedom from
regulation could implicate many economic and safety analyses that are
even less within the competence of judges to understand than are those
implicated by the right of livelihood. Requiring judges to understand
these issues sufficiently to exercise judicial review is not the same as
requiring judges to "substitute their judgment" for that of the legislature.
As explained below, judicial review does not involve making the political
decisions; it is a checking function designed to insure that the political
decisions are made on the right premises. Unless the claim of a regulatee
can be framed in terms of the right of livelihood, thus invoking both the
labor and personality fimctions, the lack of institutional competence in the
courts should probably suffice to produce dismissal of the claim.
Judge Posner describes the "libertarian argument" as an argument that
government is prevented by the nature of the social compact from
involving itself in redistribution of goods and services.3' He rejects the
argument for three reasons: (1) it confuses the notion of limited govern-
ment with democratic government; (2) it leads to a government obligation
to provide services within the compact; and (3) courts are incompetent to
assess the competing economic considerations of policy.3' I disagree
with the third reason, am dubious of the second, but basically agree with
the first. The following simple example will suffice to make the point.
At its extreme, the argument for a general freedom from regulation
asserts that "government programs uniformly do more harm than
good." The argument contends that the Lochner Court was correct
's Posner, supra note 41, at 21.
3" Id at 21-24.
30 Note, supra note 3, at 1372 (citing Ronald Coase, Economis and Public Policy,
[Vol 82
RIGHT OF LIvELIHoOD
because the "baker's union and the large institutional bakeries simply
pushed through a law that would benefit them at the expense of
politically unorganized consumers and small bakeries."' Although this
assertion, if true, would have many of the same overtones of political
corruption that. militate in favor of a general right of competition, the
argument ignores the externalities of the transaction between employer
and employee. Wage and hour laws are not enacted to benefit the worker
who has the job so much as to benefit the unemployed worker who
would get a job if the current workers' hours were reduced. Therefore, if
the consumer pays more for the same product, the higher price should be
offset by the greater circulation of money in the economy, which allows
the consumer to charge more for his or her services in the workplace. The
interlocking nature of all of these relationships supposedly justifies the
regulation and demonstrates the inability of a court to deal with all
aspects of the transaction. Only the legislature can adopt the plethora of
controls that are needed to ensure that each apparent harm is compensated
by another, perhaps indirect, benefit. The legislature's adoption of a
regulation that benefits one group without a corresponding public benefit
creates a problem, but the constitutional protection is to be found in a
guaranteed right, not a general freedom from regulation.
In summary, with regard to the issue of whether to recognize
economic rights under the Due Process Clause, the Court has already
created a right of livelihood and should recognize its substantive due
process dimensions. Furthermore, even though a general freedom from
regulation is not warranted, recognizing some due process limitations as
antecedents to the takings question might ease the analysis in the takings
area. Some general right of competition is lurking in the wings, but it is
not yet ready for recognition.
B. Techniques of Judicial Review
Slaughterhouse 2  was never officially overruled during the
Lochner 3 era. Similarly, Lochner has never been overruled in the post-
New Deal era. What the Court has said of Lochner is that the test for
substantive due process is merely the "rational basis" test, in which the
in LARGE CORPORATIONS IN A CHANGING SocIETY 169, 183-84 (J. Weston e&, 1975)).
341 Id. at 1373.
m Slaugbter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
4 Lociher v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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Court will accept or even construct any possible theory on which the
legislature could have found that the regulation in question would serve the
public interest." The effect, as stated in the Court own opinions, is no
longer to ask the question.3
In addition to the strong social3" and historical factors3" causing the
Court to abandon its questioning of legislative judgments, the rational basis
test itself is an impediment. It takes an exceptionally courageous judge to
declare that an entire legislative majority has reached an "irrational"
conclusion. The very words themselves constitute a hindrance to the exercise
of the judicial review function. On the other hand, the "compelling state
interest" test would move us too far back in the Lochner direction. Modem
tools of economic analysis should save the Court from Lochner difficulties
no matter what phrasing is chosen for the new substantive due process test.
The Court could employ a straightforward statement that it will strike
down legislation that is not reasonable in its production of positive social
benefits. The focus on social benefits will inevitably draw the Court into
assessing the wisdom of regulation versus competition in a given market This
is unfortunate from a political standpoint because it returns the Court to the
posture of second-guessing the legislature and substituting the Courtt own
judgment concerning the wisdom or desirability of regulatory schemes. There
is no escape from this posture, however, except by abandoning the field as
the Court has done for the last several decades.
' See supra notes 182-95 and accompanying text.
3s See supra notes 182-95 and accompanying text.
Unquestionably, there are arguments showing that the business of debt adjusting
has social utility, but such arguments are properly addressed to the legislature,
not to us. We refuse to sit as a "superlegislature to weigh the wisdom of
legislation," and we emphatically refuse to go back to the time when courts
used the Due Process Clause "to shike down state laws, regulatory of business
and industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of
harmony with a particular school of thought."
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. at 726, 731 (1963) (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v.
Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) and Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
' he Court has expressed concern that in American society, some things are simply
best left up to the legislative branch, which is meant to be the people's branch, which is
meant to be the people's representative. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 729-30.
' One of the key historical factors was the attempt by President Roosevelt to alter
the structure of the federal court system in the wake of the courts' active role in slrlg
several New Deal programs for being unconstitutional Although President Roosevett's
attempt to pack the Court with justices more favorable to his programs failed, this attempt
has significantly influenced the judiciary. For a discussion of this factor, see PETER
GRAHAM FIsH, THE POLITICS oF FEDERAL JUDiCIAL ADMmISTRTION 112-30 (1973).
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The first step may be to require the legislature to state the objectives
and reasons for its rule, just as with an administrative agency. Indeed, the
California state courts have come very close to this approach in a series
of cases dealing principally with zoning variances and water rights'
If the legislative objective is stated by the legislature itself, then a means-
end test can be applied. The result, rather than being the compelling
interest test, would be rational basis in a procedural posture that ties
reasons to results. If the legislation does serve stated legislative goals, the
next step would be to determine whether it invades a protected interest,
such as the right of livelihood. If so, then familiar techniques of judicial
review require the Court to balance the stated public objectives with the
purposes behind the defined right.
In the means-end portion of the exercise, the Court will need to
address itself to the factual issue of whether there is a public benefit
flowing from the regulation. In a rare instance, the benefit rationale will
be as transparently empty as in the river pilots' case.' 9 Of course, in
these cases, concluding that a public benefit is lacking is the same as
holding that there is no rational connection between the objective and the
means and, thus, no rational basis for the regulation. The difference
between rational basis and a straightforward benefits test is merely the
phrasing. In most cases, however, the regulation would arguably promote
some public benefit while imposing onerous burdens on some individuals.
The public benefits test would have to work in something like the
following fashion.
Imagine a city ordinance that requires $100,000 in operating capital
before one can obtain a license to operate a ski repair business. The basis
is the same as for many similar regulations, that the operating capital
assures the stability of the business and provides a fund for satisfaction
of judgments against the business. The result, however, is to force out of
business all but the largest company in town, including some small
entrepreneurs who might actually be better ski mechanics or offer
something the public wants in the way of personalized service. One
approach would be to make the validity of the ordinance turn on the
anticompetitive monopolization effect in the local market, reducing the
Due Process Clause to a reiteration of federal antitrust laws. Sound
u, Nat'lAudubon Society v. Superior CL of Alpine Cry., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)
(allocation of water from Mono Lake); Topanga Ass'nfor a Scenic Community v. County
of Los Angeles, 522 P.2d 12 (Cal. 1974); Strumsky v. San Diego Cty. Employers Ass'n,
520 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1974) (if a "fundamental vested right' is involved, the court must
exercise independent review of the evidentiary record).
' See sipra notes 62-71.
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judicial administration of constitutional principles argues against ad hoc
rules and decision making that emphasize local conditions."s Even
worse would be a focus on the motives of the city council, which could
be inferred from facts such as the ownership of the surviving business by
a councilman's brother-in-law, because motive is logically irrelevant to
either impact on other entrepreneurs or public benefits."'
Preventing perversion of the political process certainly is a value that
underlies economic substantive due process, but it is not a value that
translates readily into standards for judicial review. Almost all of the
evidence relevant to the issue would be off the public record, including
discussions (if they took place at all) behind closed doors. The judicial
inquiry would include a great deal of speculation about whether a
legislator could vote against the wishes of a particular constituency, how
well organized competing constituencies are, and how many legislators
are subject- to varying kinds of interest-group pressures.
Both because the motives of the legislators are irrelevant to the
impacts of their acts and the evidence would be unusually "soft," the
political perversion issue should not be the focus of judicial review. Thus,
we are left with the essential question of whether the anticompetitive
effects outweigh the safety benefits. The appropriate focus is on the
public risks and benefits, an inquiry in which the "natural rights" of the
individual have virtually no role other than to define the problem. The
same analysis can be applied to limiting the dispensing of eyeglasses to
licensed optometrists, requiring apprenticeships for television repair
persons, limiting the practice of law to graduates of ABA law schools, or
a host of other market entry restriction devices.
Now we must again face the process-oriented reasons why the courts
have abandoned a judicial review role in this field. The questions to be
asked require a relative weighing of public risks and benefits, an exercise
that is both familiar yet troubling from the arena of the "personal"
liberties. The courts' constitutional mandate arises when the Due Process
Clause is triggered by a regulation that touches on the personality, labor,
" One problem with the trucking and other Dormant Commerce Clause cases is the
tendency to make the outcome depend on local facts more than on nationally applicable
principles.
S' Professor Wonnell urges a focus on pressure group politics. See Wonne11, supra
note 8, at 108-11. Professor Phillips concludes that such a focus is impossible. I would
agree with Professor Phillips, but add that the inquiry is also somewhat beside the point
See Phillips, supra note 2, at 301-13. While insulation from pressure group politics may
be one of the values that underlies the right of livelihood, it is not the focus of the right
As Judge Posner urges, our job is interpretation, rather than perfection of the economic
and political system. See Posner, supra note 41, at 31-38.
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or welfare functions of an economic-property system. The test employed
is whether the regulation lacks sufficient social safety or health justifica-
tion, a question that should have been answered by the political process
were it functioning well. Under the Holmes approach, 2 the recourse
of the public that is being disserved by a "dumb" regulation is to the
legislative process.
Although we can defer to the legislature on the economic productivity
issue, sending the dissatisfied competitor to the legislative process is too
glib an answer. The individuals whose oxen are being gored usually lack
any political clout (otherwise they would not be in this fix), most trades
and businesses are too complex to be easily understood by the average
voter, and the public generally is uninformed about which regulations are
good and which are bad.
The Supreme Court's stated reason, following Holmes' admonition,
for deferring to the legislative judgment was the belief that courts had no
special role or expertise in the arena of social and economic policy. 3
This reason, however, is not a good explanation for the abdication of the
last half century. Courts certainly have as much wisdom and insight as
the legislative bodies in assessing whether public benefits outweigh costs
of a particular measure. The better explanation for the abdication is that
the courts are not able to take on the full range of a given social or
economic agenda at their own behest. A court that strikes one regulation
stands in great danger of detrimentally affecting a number of other
regulations. Because regulations in the economic arena interlock just as
economic life interlocks, courts must be particularly cautious about
exercising constitutional review authority in the economic sphere.
What we are describing are various points on the spectrum of human
conduct that run from the most isolated to the most interconnected. The
interconnected end of the spectrum implicates governmental regulations
that affect economic life, an area in which courts must be acutely
conscious that their actions may well have unknown effects on parties not
before the court. At the isolated or autonomy end of the spectrum are
those aspects of humnan behavior most susceptible to the notion of
privacy, such as possession of printed material in one's own home. The
latter behavior affects virtually no one, and the courts have little difficulty
weighing public benefits and costs.
" Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 65 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I strongly
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority
to embody their opinions in law.').
33 See New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) ("[Ihe judiciary may
not sit as a super legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy
determinations made in areas that ... [do not] affect fundamental rights. .... ).
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We will never know whether Justice Black in Ferguson" or
Richard Epstein3 5 has the better of the original understanding of the
Due Process Clause; the truth of the matter is that the world has become
so complex since the New Deal that the political process rationale simply
no longer fits the circumstances. So what do we do? Do we leave it alone
until there is a constitutional amendment? Do we adopt the Epstein
approach, which places a heavy burden of proof on the legislature to
show public benefit and requires compensation unless there is an
offsetting mutuality of benefit?
The best approach would be one that strikes a middle ground between
inaction and the Epstein approach. Under this proposed approach, the
challenger would have the burden of proof. If the challenger can persuade
the court that the regulatory method is unrelated to the putative benefits,
then the regulation should be stricken. The effect on public regulatory
processes will actually be quite mild. The litigation required to produce
such a result would be very expensive and time-consuming, and the
likelihood of a favorable holding would be minuscule. The number of
plaintiffs taking such cases to trial would be very few, and the number
of regulations stricken even fewer. Nevertheless, the process and theories
should be available. Otherwise, we have allowed the state extreme
latitude to dispel individual initiative and creativity to the detriment of us
alL
What we are left with is the conclusion that "rational basis" is just an
unfortunate choice of words for the proper test. A "rational basis with
teeth" test could cure some of the worst of the anticompetitive measures
embodied in regulatory laws while not recreating the Lochner problems.
Some gain could be expected from amalgamating several doctrinal
developments into a single heading of substantive due process. But the
doctrine could hardly become what it was in the early part of this
century, or what some of its more strident proponents might envision,
because the Court now has available tools of analysis and information
that were not previously available. The essence of the right of livelihood
and the possible right of competition that are advocated here flows
directly from the English rules on unregulated monopolies that were
contained in the Due Process Clause. Although translating the antimono-
poly principle into modem commercial contexts is not easy, there is a
clean historical line back to that principle. There is also sufficient post-
' Ferguson v. Knipa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).311 Epstein, supra note 306, at 297-99.
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1937 demonstration of abuse to warrant recapitulation of the rights that
were abandoned in the 1937 revolution.
CONCLUSION
The abandonment of substantive due process sometime after 1937 did
not result in just deferral to the economic policies of legislative bodies.
Instead, the Court essentially has held that the Constitution does not enact
lasting limits on the legislature's ability to regulate our "economic" lives.
But that holding is far too broad to survive comfortably in the modem
world, and the Court has gone about creating limits on legislative
authority through a variety of other rubrics. The time has come for a
straightforward recognition of the utility of the substantive due process
concept. The post-1937 tools of economic analysis that the Court is likely
to use mean that the revived doctrine would not have the harsh bite of the
Lochner era. There is, however, much to be said for limiting the
harshness of the legislative results that have been made possible in the
wake of the Court's capitulation.
The scope of the revived doctrine will almost certainly be limited to
protection of the right of livelihood. Although there may also be room for
a broader right of competition, there does not seem to be any reason to
recognize a generalized freedom from regulation. In this posture,
substantive due process does not threaten any of the institutional values
that were threatened by the more sweeping version of the Lochner era.
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